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INTRODUCTION
The language of property underlies the way we talk
about the relationship between people and things in both
common law and civil law systems. Property, along with
contract and tort, is one of the fundamental divisions of
private law in the common law. Because property is so
† Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University; Ph.D., history,
Cornell University, 2011; M.A., history, Cornell University, 2009; J.D., LL.M.,
Cornell Law School, 2005; B.A., College of William and Mary, 2002. I would like
to thank David Seipp, Sasha Volokh, Richard Helmholz, John Hudson, John
Langbein, Alfred Brophy, and Daniel Ernst for their insightful comments on
this Paper. I would also like to thank the participants in the Cornell Law School
faculty retreat, where I presented an earlier draft of this Paper, particularly
Joshua Chafetz, Jeffrey Rachlinski, Annelise Riles, Gregory Alexander, Emily
Sherwin, Bernadette Meyler, Kevin Clermont, and Sidney Tarrow, whose
comments were extremely helpful in revising the Paper.
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fundamental to the way lawyers think, we tend to treat
property as if it is a natural way to view the world. But the
language of property has a history. The earliest common
law writs, all of which had something to do with rights in
land, make no mention of property.1 The earliest surviving
sources that associate the early common law writs of right,
novel disseisin, mort d’ancestor, utrum, and darrein
presentment with a law of property date to the late 1180s,
twenty to forty years after the writs were first developed.2 It
is, therefore, anachronistic to refer to these writs as the
English law of property, but it is also difficult to avoid.
The language of property actually comes out of a very
specific cultural and historical context. It comes from
Roman law and canon law, which together formed the
medieval ius commune, or common law of Christendom.3 It
was the ius commune, the ancestor of the civil law systems
that dominate continental Europe today, that gave English
its words possession and property.
In this Article, I will look at two legal treatises that
span the period between 1187 and 1258. Both were likely
written by people who worked in the English royal courts.
The first of these two treatises, De Legibus et
Consuetudinibus Regni Angliae, known today as Glanvill,
was written about a generation after Henry II’s famous
reforms and shows some signs of Roman law influence.4 The
focus of the article will be on the later of the two treatises.
In the 1220s, a justice or clerk in the royal courts began
work on a new treatise and seems to have given it a title
almost identical to that of Glanvill. It is called De Legibus et
Consuetudinibus Angliae (On the Laws and Customs of
England) or De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Anglicanis (On
1. David Seipp has observed that English lawyers got along until about 1490
without any single concept that had the scope of the word “property.” David J.
Seipp, The Concept of Property in the Early Common Law, 12 LAW & HIST. REV.
29, 31 (1994).
2. See discussion infra Parts I.B, II.
3. R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL CANON LAW 20 (1996) (“The ius
commune . . . stood above the rules of the different courts, the particular lands,
and even the individual legislative bodies among which European jurisdictions
were divided.”).
4. G.D.G. Hall, Introduction to THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF
REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL, at xxxvi-xl (G.D.G. Hall
ed. & trans., Oxford: Clarendon Press 2002) (1965) [hereinafter GLANVILL].
THE
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English Laws and Customs) in most manuscripts.5 Much of
the treatise had been written by 1236, although it went
through at least one, and probably two, rounds of writing
and revision between 1236 and 1258.6 The hands of several
royal justices touched this treatise. Martin of Pattishall,
who was the senior justice of the common bench (later the
Court of Common Pleas) from 1217 to 1229, may have been
involved in the earliest stages.7 William of Ralegh,
Pattishall’s clerk and the future chief justice of the court
coram rege (the court “before the king,” which would later
be known as the King’s Bench), almost certainly wrote the
bulk of the treatise.8 Henry of Bratton, Ralegh’s clerk, added
some material in the 1250s, and may have been working on
it much earlier.9 It is from a misspelling of Bratton’s name
that we get the treatise’s common title, Bracton.10
I will show that it was the authors of Bracton who first
tried to work the practices of the royal courts and the norms
of the Anglo-Norman landed elite into a law of property on
5. BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS
trans. 1968–1977) [hereinafter BRACTON].

OF

ENGLAND (Samuel E. Thorne

6. See Thomas Joseph McSweeney, Priests of Justice: Creating Law out of
Administration in Thirteenth-Century England 114-17 (2011) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University) (on file with Cornell University Library).
7. RALPH V. TURNER, THE ENGLISH JUDICIARY
BRACTON, C. 1176–1239, at 194 (1985).

IN THE

AGE

OF

GLANVILL

AND

8. Paul Brand, The Age of Bracton, in THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW:
CENTENARY ESSAYS ON “POLLOCK AND MAITLAND” 78 (John Hudson ed., 1996)
[hereinafter Brand, The Age of Bracton]; Samuel E. Thorne, Translator’s
Introduction, in 3 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND xxxvi (1977).
For a contrary view, that the treatise was written in the 1250s and Henry de
Bratton was the primary author, see J.L. Barton, The Mystery of Bracton, 14 J.
LEGAL HIST. 1, 8-9 (1993); J.L. Barton, The Authorship of Bracton: Again, 30 J.
OF LEGAL HIST. 117, 117-19, 150-51 (2009). For Brand’s response to Barton, see
Paul Brand, The Date and Authorship of Bracton: A Response, 31 J. LEGAL HIST.
217, 217 (2010).
9. 3 Thorne, supra note 8, at xliii.
10. Bratton came from the village of Bratton Fleming in Devonshire. Several
of the early manuscripts of the treatise name the author as Henry de Bratton,
which probably became Henry de Bracton by way of a scribal error. In Gothic
script, c’s and t’s look very similar, and it would be easy to mistake one for the
other. Paul Brand, Bratton, Henry of (d. 1268), OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY,
http://www.oxforddnb.com.gate.lib.buffalo.edu/view/article/3163
(last visited June 16, 2012).
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the Roman model.11 The authors attempted to create a legal
system using Roman law as their framework. They were
heavily invested in showing that the practices of the
English royal courts, practices which they themselves
administered as royal justices, could be understood through
the lens of Roman law. They wanted to prove that the work
that they performed in the royal courts was part of an
international system of ius commune. This made them, in a
sense, the common law’s first comparativists.
In trying to reconcile English practice with Roman law,
however, the authors of Bracton discovered that it was
difficult to make the Roman language of property fit with
what they knew about the relationship between people and
land. The Bracton authors twist Roman law to fit with their
own perceptions of landholding. We have texts that provide
us with more conventional readings of Roman law from the
thirteenth century, among them Azo of Bologna’s Summae
on the Institutes and the Codex, which the authors of
Bracton relied upon heavily, and a series of Roman law
lectures that were written in England around the year
1200.12 Treating these texts as a baseline for contemporary
understandings of Roman law and then turning to the ways
the authors of Bracton twist those understandings, we can
get a sense of how the royal justices’ conceptions of the
relationship between people and land differed from those of
the jurists in the universities.
In Part I of this article, I will describe the three
languages that provided the vocabulary for the authors of
treatises: the Anglo-French vernacular of landholding, the
writs of the royal courts, and Roman law. In Part II, I will
look at the ways the Glanvill author began to mix all three
11. Bracton’s relationship to Roman law has long been noted by historians.
Henry Sumner Maine thought that Bracton had “put off on his countrymen as a
compendium of pure English law a treatise of which the entire form and a third
of the contents were directly borrowed from the Corpus Juris . . . .” HENRY
SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 82 (16th ed. 1897). Although Maine’s assertion
that one-third of the treatise is borrowed from the Roman Corpus Iuris Civilis is
certainly an exaggeration, the authors of Bracton did take their organization
from Roman law and borrowed extensively from both ancient and contemporary
Roman law texts. See discussion infra, Part III.
12. AZO, SUMMA AZONIS SIVE LOCUPLES IURIS CIVILIS THESAURUS (1581); THE
TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW IN ENGLAND AROUND 1200, at xx, liv (Francis De
Zulueta & Peter Stein eds., 1990).
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languages together. In Part III, I will discuss the Bracton
treatise. I will look in particular at three different,
contradictory schemes for reconciling the Roman law of
property to the practices of the English courts that appear
at different points in the treatise. The authors showed their
deep commitment to placing English practice within the
ambit of Roman law by the extreme measures they took to
reconcile the systems even when it must have become clear
to them that reconciliation was impossible. In Part IV, I will
discuss why their attempts at reconciliation did not work.
The authors were committed to the notions that all titles
were relative and that one’s right to the land strengthened
gradually over time. These notions were common to the
Francophone Anglo-Norman landed elite of their time, but
fit poorly with Roman law. The Bracton authors were thus
required to perform some complicated verbal gymnastics to
show that English practice could be described using the
language of Roman law. In the conclusion, I will discuss
what this historical example can teach us about using
property as a category in comparative legal scholarship.
I. THREE LANGUAGES OF LAND
The authors of the treatises we will examine were
essentially speaking three different, but related, languages,
each of which had its own vocabulary and grammar to
describe the relationship between people and land.13 When
the last of these treatises was written, the idea of dividing
land into “estates” as we do in the modern common law was
still several decades in the future. In fact, the English
would not regularly use the moniker common law to refer to
the practices of the English courts for several decades.14
13. I do not use the term law to describe these three systems, because it
tends to be misleading. Anglo-French elites in England were not accustomed to
speak about their landholding in terms of law. In fact, the word lei (cognate with
the modern French loi), was more often used in epics and romances to mean
“religion.” LA CHANSON DE ROLAND 30, 32, 58, 66 (Ian Short ed. & trans., 2d ed.
1990). The writ system was only described as a legal system after Roman law
influence had entered into the equation. See discussion infra Part II.
14. There are a handful of examples from the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries of the phrase ius commune or commune regni ius being used to refer to
the practices of the royal courts. JOHN HUDSON, THE FORMATION OF THE ENGLISH
COMMON LAW 18-19 (1996). The phrase commune ley or lex communis, from
which we get our modern common law, first began to appear in the last decades
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These three languages of landholding will therefore seem
rather foreign.
A. The French Vernacular
Although we do not know the identities of all of the
authors who worked on Glanvill and Bracton, it is a safe bet
that they had all grown up as members of the AngloNorman landed elite or, at the very least, had become
acclimated to the landed elite’s patterns of thought as they
gained the patronage necessary to go to school and to work
in the royal and ducal courts.15 The Francophone elites of
England in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries shared a
vernacular language of landholding with their counterparts
in Northern France. English elites, who were learning to
speak English in larger numbers by 1200, but who still
spoke French among themselves, moved in a Northern
French cultural world.16 They read epics and romances in
Old French that told of wars and adventures in the
Frankish Empire of Charlemagne and the Britain of King
Arthur.17 These literary works often involved legal disputes
and would have both reflected and informed the legal norms
of this class.18 They are thus one site where we can see the
vernacular language of landholding at work.
The twelfth-century epic Raoul de Cambrai, which we
know was read at the court of Henry II, describes a dispute
over an inheritance in tenth-century France.19 The epic
of the thirteenth century. See Paul Brand, Law and Custom in the English
Thirteenth Century Common Law, in CUSTOM: THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF A
LEGAL CONCEPT IN THE MIDDLE AGES 17, 21 (Per Andersen & Mia MünsterSwendsen eds., 2009).
15. See TURNER, supra note 7, at 205-06.
16. See Ian Short, Language and Literature, in A COMPANION TO THE ANGLONORMAN WORLD 191, 204 (Christopher Harper-Bill & Elizabeth van Houts eds.,
2002).
17. The oldest extant manuscript of the oldest surviving French epic, the
Song of Roland, is written in the Anglo-Norman dialect of French. See Ian
Short, Introduction, in LA CHANSON DE ROLAND 9 (Ian Short ed., 2d ed. 1990).
18. Paul Hyams, Henry II and Ganelon, 4 SYRACUSE SCHOLAR 23, 25-26
(1983).
19. Gerald of Wales references a conversation he had with none other than
Ranulph de Glanvill, the king’s justiciar, head of the royal court system, about
the poem. Glanvill was not, unfortunately, the author of the treatise that is
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provides us with some of the vocabulary of landholding in
the Northern French world, and the principal metaphor for
the relationship between people and land was indeed
holding. The verb tenir was used to describe a person’s
control over land, as the noun tenement could be used to
describe the land he held.20 Indeed, the word tenant was
used far more often than vassal in both England and
Northern France to describe a person who held land of a
lord.21 Before he held land, the tenant needed to be placed in
control of it, and for this a different metaphor was used. The
Old French verb saisir, etymologically related to a word
meaning “to sit,” meant “to invest” or “to put in physical
control.”22 It began to appear as a noun, saisine, the state of
having been invested, in the twelfth century.23 England’s
French-speaking elites thus spoke of being seated on their
land and afterwards of holding it.
The conflict in Raoul de Cambrai centers on the fief of
Cambrai, which Raoul’s father had held during his lifetime.
Upon his death, however, the Frankish emperor passes over
Raoul, a minor at the time, in favor of a loyal, but landless,
supporter.24 Raoul spends the early part of the poem trying
to recover his inheritance. In the arguments of Raoul and
his supporters before the emperor, we can see some of the
normative arguments that one might make to claim land.
The emperor is said to have done wrong to have deprived
Raoul of his heritage by giving Cambrai to another man in
fieaige or in fee.25 Raoul speaks as if the heritage is
normative; a person who inherited his land has a stronger
claim to it than someone who acquired it in some other way.
The landed elite of northern France and post-Conquest
England did indeed make a distinction between inherited
land, which they tended not to alienate in order to preserve
attributed to him. Paul Hyams, The Common Law and the French Connection,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE BATTLE CONFERENCE ON ANGLO-NORMAN STUDIES IV,
1981 at 78, 80 (R. Allen Brown ed., 1982).
20. RAOUL DE CAMBRAI 40 (William Kibler ed., Sarah Kay trans., 1996).
21. See SUSAN REYNOLDS, FIEFS AND VASSALS 347, 388 (1994).
22. See ALGIRDAS JULIEN GREIMAS, DICTIONAIRE DE L’ANCIEN FRANÇAIS 42-43,
539-40 (3d ed. 2004); RAOUL DE CAMBRAI, supra note 20, at 44.
23. GREIMAS, supra note 22, at 540.
24. RAOUL DE CAMBRAI, supra note 20, at 40.
25. Id.
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it for the eldest son at the holder’s death, and acquired land,
which the holder could alienate with relative freedom.26 The
most famous example of this restraint on the ability to
alienate the heritage from the head of the lignage actually
comes from the post-Conquest context: William the
Conqueror’s eldest son, Robert Curthose, received the
family patrimony of the duchy of Normandy when his father
died, but William felt free to will the kingdom of England,
as an acquisition that was not part of the family’s ancient
inheritance, to his second son, William Rufus.27 The lineage
thus had a claim on the heritage that restricted the powers
even of the current tenant to alienate it. Raoul is not just
concerned that the emperor has given away his heritage,
however; he is also concerned that he has given it in fieaige.
In twelfth-century English charters, the word fee usually
meant that the land was held in such a manner that it was
heritable, although this was not always the case.28 Stephen
White has demonstrated that words like fee were
contestable. To a lord, the word fee might imply a grant only
for life; to a tenant, it might mean a heritable grant.29 Raoul
himself uses the term in both senses. When he is being
deprived of his own land, Raoul invokes his right to inherit
the fee.30 When he later asks the emperor to grant him the
fee of another deceased baron, he treats it as a mere life
estate that that baron’s children have no right to inherit.31
26. JOHN HUDSON, LAND, LAW, AND LORDSHIP IN ANGLO-NORMAN ENGLAND
204-06 (1994) (noting that land that had been acquired during the tenant’s life
or the tenant’s father’s life was more freely alienable without the family’s
permission than the family’s ancient inheritance was).
27. FRANK BARLOW, WILLIAM RUFUS 47-48 (1983) (discussing Orderic Vitalis’s
account of William the Conqueror’s death, and his bequest of England, as an
acquisition, to William Rufus).
28. HUDSON, supra note 26, at 94-97. Paul Hyams has argued, however, that
the fee was not always associated with heritability. Paul R. Hyams, Notes on the
Transformation of the Common Law Fief into the Common Law Tenure in Fee,
in LAWS, LAWYERS, AND TEXTS: STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL LEGAL HISTORY IN HONOUR
OF PAUL BRAND (Susanne Jenks et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2011).
29. Stephen D. White, The Discourse of Inheritance in Twelfth-Century
France: Alternative Models of the Fief in Raoul de Cambrai, in LAW AND
GOVERNMENT IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND AND NORMANDY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR
JAMES HOLT 173, 179-80 (George Garnett & John Hudson eds., 1994).
30. See id. at 179.
31. See id. at 180.
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Even if the word is contestable, a grant of Raoul’s
inheritance to someone else in (potentially heritable) fieaige
threatens Raoul’s claim and the claim his descendants
would have after him.32
Raoul’s supporters also use the language of right (droit),
a term that often appears in English land disputes in the
twelfth century.33 Raoul’s mother, Alais, goads Raoul into
fighting for Cambrai as “your right” (ton droit).34 The term
was difficult to define, even for contemporaries, because it
was thought to be quasi-mystical.35 Questions of right were
submitted to trial by battle or ordeal, which elicited God’s
judgment, in England and Northern France.36 It seems that
there were doubts about the efficacy even of God’s
judgment, because the process by which it was obtained was
riddled with various human interventions that had the
potential to throw off the proceedings.37 When Henry II
allowed certain cases brought by writ of right to be decided
by juries, and thus by purely human means, the human
jurors were asked only who had the greater right.38 They
could not know who had absolute right, since this was
known to God alone.39
32. RAOUL DE CAMBRAI, supra note 20, at 40.
33. Id. at 74, 78, 92.
34. Id. at 92. Several other characters say that Raoul “has right.” Id. at 74,
78.
35. Paul R. Hyams, Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common
Law, in ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SAMUEL E.
THORNE 106 (Morris S. Arnold et al. eds., 1981) (“[T]he mystery of seisin and
right, for example, or the question of who ought to hold land under dispute in
Domesday invasiones, was much less easily abstracted from the divine
judgment.”).
36. Id.
37. See Paul Hyams, The Legal Revolution and the Discourse of Dispute in the
Twelfth Century, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO MEDIEVAL ENGLISH CULTURE
63-64 (Andrew Galloway ed., 2011) (arguing that, while the late twelfth century
showed no crisis of faith about the ordeal, the literature of the time does provide
numerous examples of ordeals that are misinterpreted by their human
observers).
38. See EARLY REGISTERS OF WRITS 6 (Elsa de Haas & G.D.G. Hall eds., 1970);
GLANVILL, supra note 4, at 30.
39. Donald Sutherland thought that the assize of novel disseisin was
originally designed as a lesser writ than the writ of right, which was decided by
trial by battle, in order to assuage the elites’ fears that their landholding would
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The most important aspects of this vernacular language
to keep in mind are that heritability had a strong normative
force; the rights of lineages were as much at stake in
property disputes as the rights of individuals. People felt
that the heir of the last person who held the land, Raoul, for
example, had a strong claim to the right, the emperor’s
grant notwithstanding. But no human being could know
who had the right in an absolute sense, so the AngloNorman landed elite concerned themselves primarily with
questions of who, between two claimants, had a better right
to the land, and imagined an absolute right, good against all
the world, as something that was beyond practical reach.
B. The Language of Writs
The
Anglo-French
vernacular
influenced
and
intertwined with the second language that the early treatise
authors spoke: the language of writs. All of our authors
worked in the courts of twelfth- and thirteenth-century
be subject to juries rather than to God. The fact that a loser in an assize of novel
disseisin might still bring a writ of right and obtain God’s judgment through
trial by battle “guaranteed that a man might hold his lands freely in reliance on
himself under God and not subject to the king’s will or to the word of such of his
neighbors as might happen to be sworn on a jury.” DONALD W. SUTHERLAND, THE
ASSIZE OF NOVEL DISSEISIN 37 (1973). Paul Hyams thinks that the jury may have
originally have been justified as a form of divine judgment in order to sell it to
landholders who were used to having their land disputes settled by duels.
Hyams, supra note 35, at 118.
The idea that right was knowable to God alone was also familiar to Roman
jurists. The author of the second introduction to the Bracton treatise, probably
William of Ralegh, quotes the Institutes’ definition of justice: “the constant and
unfailing will to give to each his right.” 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 23; see also
J.INST.1.1. He then goes on to reproduce Azo of Bologna’s commentary on the
passage, in which Azo explains how we can refer to human acts as just even
though perfect justice belongs to God alone. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 23.
Azo points out that God “gives to each man in accordance with his deserts” and
“is neither variable nor inconstant in his dispositions and wills.” AZO, supra note
12, at 1047. For justice to be perfect, it must be perfectly constant. According to
Azo and Ralegh, human beings can also be said to be just even though they are
variable and inconstant in their actions, because humans can have a constant
and unfailing will to give to each his right, even if they will inevitably fail in the
execution of that will. Thus, human beings are incapable of being perfectly just
and giving to each his right, but they can intend to be perfectly just. Only God
can be perfectly just in the execution. Id. at 1047; 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at
23.
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England, which ran on these short, Latin-language
documents. A writ was simply an order from the king.40
Henry II (r. 1154–1189) and his councilors had
revolutionized their use in the royal administration in
England and the ducal administration in Normandy,
although the Angevin king did not introduce them in the
other parts of his vast continental domain.41 Henry
introduced a series of writs de cursu, which anyone could
acquire from the royal chancery by paying a small fee.42
These new writs could be used to start proceedings in the
royal courts.43 The most important for our purposes will be
the writs that were used to settle disputes over land held in
lay fee, i.e., not by the church in free alms. The procedures
these writs set into motion were called assizes or
recognitions.44 Assize, like seisin, was etymologically related
to the verb “to sit,” and probably originally referred to the
sittings of the king’s council where these procedures were
created.45 Assize also became the usual term for the royal
orders, somewhat like early statutes, that came out of these
sittings.46 It was eventually attached to the writs
themselves and to the juries of twelve men who decided
cases under those writs.47 The word recognition was used to
refer to the panel of jurors who came to recognize
(recognoscere) whether certain events had happened.48 The
assize of novel disseisin could be sought by a person who
had been recently ejected from his land (the word novel in
the name of the writ means recent; the word disseisin refers
to the ejectment or dispossession). The assize of mort
d’ancestor aided a person who was the nearest heir of the
40. M.T. CLANCHY, FROM MEMORY
at 90-91 (2d ed. 1993).

TO

WRITTEN RECORD: ENGLAND 1066–1307,

41. Daniel Power, Henry, Duke of the Normans (1149/50-1189), in HENRY II,
NEW INTERPRETATIONS 95, 102 (Christopher Harper-Bill & Nicholas Vincent
eds., 2007).
42. 1 THE 1235 SURREY EYRE 27 (C.A.F. Meekings ed., 1979).
43. See HUDSON, supra note 14, at 143.
44. See GLANVILL, supra note 4, at 149.
45. GREIMAS, supra note 22, at 42-43.
46. H.G. RICHARDSON & G.O. SAYLES, LAW
ÆTHELBERHT TO MAGNA CARTA 102-03 (1966).
47. Id. at 108-09.
48. GLANVILL, supra note 4, at 150.

AND

LEGISLATION

FROM
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last person to die seised of a piece of land.49 Both of these
writs ordered the sheriff to summon a jury to appear before
the king’s justices and thus brought the case directly to the
king’s courts.50 The writ of right was somewhat different.
The writ of right patent, available to all freemen who did
not hold land directly of the king, was addressed to the
plaintiff’s lord and commanded him to do right to the
plaintiff with a warning that if he did not, the sheriff would
take the case into his hands.51 Once someone sued on this
writ, the case could easily be transferred to the king’s
court.52 The writ of right could be decided by a trial by battle
or put to a jury by way of a procedure called the grand
assize, which was introduced later in Henry II’s reign as an
alternative to trial by battle.53
The language that the writs used would eventually
become a technical vocabulary of its own, but the royal
councilors who drafted these writs drew on the languages
that they already knew. There has been debate about
whether Roman law played any part in the drafting of
Henry II’s writs.54 If it did, and I think it doubtful that it
played much of a role, it has left no mark on the language of
the writs themselves. Despite the fact that the writs were
written in Latin, the drafters took their inspiration from the
Anglo-French vernacular. Mort d’ancestor speaks of being
seised (Latinized as seisitus or saisitus) of the land and
novel disseisin speaks of being disseised (disseisivit).55 The
49. Mort d’ancestor only aided the nearest heir if that heir was a child,
brother, sister, nephew, or niece of the deceased landholder. In the thirteenth
century, the royal courts developed other writs for parents (the writ of aiel),
grandparents (besaiel), and all other relatives (cosinage). Contemporaries
viewed these writs as part of a family of writs. See EARLY REGISTERS, supra note
38, at 280.
50. 3 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 57, 249.
51. 4 Id. at 47.
52. 4 Id. at 47-48.
53. EARLY REGISTERS, supra note 38, at 6.
54. For two recent summaries of this debate, see Anne J. Duggan, Roman,
Canon and Common law in Twelfth-Century England: The council of
Northampton (1164) Re-Examined, 83 HIST. RES. 379, 397-99 (2010) and Joshua
C. Tate, Ownership and Possession in the Early Common Law, 48 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 280, 281 (2006).
55. 3 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 57, 249.
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writs of right used the Latin terms ius and rectum.56 Both of
these terms could be translated into English as right, and it
would seem that the drafters were using them as Latin
translations of the Old French droit or, in its Anglo-French
form, dreit. So when a plaintiff in the English king’s courts
of the thirteenth century claimed land as “his right” (ius
suum), he was making essentially the same claim that
Raoul de Cambrai’s mother wanted her son to make when
she told him to go fight for Cambrai as “your right” (ton
droit).57
It was up to the justices and litigants of the late twelfth
and early thirteenth centuries to transform the words in
writs into terms of art. The writ procedures began to delimit
the range of meanings a particular word might have. The
assize of novel disseisin begins, “The king to the sheriff,
greeting. Such a one has complained to us that such a one
disseised him wrongfully and without judgment of his free
tenement in such a vill . . . .”58 The words free tenement
literally imply only that the land is held (tenement comes
from the Latin tenere or the French tenir, “to hold”) and is
held freely, i.e., not as a villein, or serf, would hold land.59
As litigants purchased writs of novel disseisin to bring their
cases to the royal courts, the justices had to decide what
types of landholding the assize would cover. They decided
that it would not cover a person holding land for a term.60 As
56. 4 Id. at 47. The writ itself was called a breve de recto and ordered the
plaintiff’s lord to do full right (plenum rectum), but when the question was put
to a jury by way of the grand assize, the question was who had the greater right
(maius ius) in the land. Id. at 47, 56. The praecipe in capite used the term ius in
the writ itself. Id.
57. RAOUL DE CAMBRAI, supra note 20, at 92.
58. 3 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 57 (emphasis added).
59. The author of GLANVILL appears to use free tenement in this general sense
at times. GLANVILL, supra note 4, at 28 (“[The grand assize] takes account so
effectively of both human life and civil condition that all men may preserve the
rights which they have in any free tenement . . . .”).
60. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 39, at 32. This was possibly because when a
landholder transferred his land to a termor, the parties traditionally did not
undertake a ceremony known as livery of seisin. This ceremony symbolically
transferred seisin of the land from one party to the other. Since seisin was not
transferred to the termor, the termor had no seisin and could not be disseised.
Since the assize gave the action to a person who was disseised, the termor could
not have an assize of novel disseisin. See id. at 32-33.
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a result, the lease for a term was not considered a free
tenement even though, according to the literal meaning of
the words, it should have been. A free tenement came to be
defined as a piece of land that was covered by the assize.
American common law preserves the technical language of
the assize; it still labels leaseholds as nonfreehold estates,
even though this makes little sense given the literal
meaning of the words.61 To rent an apartment is not to hold
land as a villein would. The justices and litigants of the
early common law thus transformed the vernacular terms
that had made their way into writs into a technical
language of writ practice.
C. Roman Law
Finally, the authors of all three of these treatises had
become familiar with the language of Roman and canon law.
Roman law had been undergoing a revival in the twelfth
century.62 Although the sequence of events is murky, by the
middle of the twelfth century at the latest there were people
systematically teaching Roman law in the Italian city of
Bologna.63 Canon law developed into an academic discipline
around this time, too, with the publication of Gratian’s
Concordance of Discordant Canons, a collection of
authoritative Church texts used as a textbook in the
Bologna schools from the middle of the century.64 Which of
the two disciplines led the developments in Bologna is not
clear.65 What is clear is that by the end of the twelfth
century, Roman and canon law had become intertwined.
While they were distinct academic disciplines with separate
faculties in the universities, students in each were required
to learn quite a bit of the other.66 They operated according to

61. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 419 (7th ed. 2010).
62. PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 43 (1999).
63. See Harry Dondorp & Eltjo J.H. Schrage, The Sources of Medieval
Learned Law, in THE CREATION OF THE IUS COMMUNE: FROM CASUS TO REGULA 7,
31 (John W. Cairns & Paul J. du Plessis eds., 2010).
64. See ANDERS WINROTH, THE MAKING OF GRATIAN’S DECRETUM 1-2 (2000).
65. Id. at 2-4.
66. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS
CANONISTS, CIVILIANS, AND COURTS 237-38 (2008).
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very similar principles and contemporaries spoke of them as
forming a single ius commune (common law).67
The Roman law that concerns us here is not the
classical Roman law of the Augustan period, or even
necessarily the law as it was taught in Bologna. Rather, we
will be concerned with Roman law as it would have been
understood by an English justice with a few years of Roman
law training living in the late twelfth or early thirteenth
century. Canon law was the law of the ecclesiastical courts
in England and our authors may have encountered ius
commune principles there, but in the treatises themselves
the Roman and canon law we encounter is presented in the
style of the schools, as a textualized, academic law. We
know that our English authors had training in Roman and
canon law by the references they make to the two laws in
their texts. The author of Glanvill used Justinian’s
Institutes, a sixth-century legal textbook.68 The authors of
Bracton used Justinian’s Digest and Codex as well.69 More
importantly, they borrowed extensively from Azo of
Bologna’s Summa Institutorum and Summa Codicis, two
commentaries on the sixth-century sources by an early
thirteenth-century Roman law glossator, which show us the
ways that people in the medieval schools were reading the
ancient texts.70 The authors of Bracton also had several
thirteenth-century procedural manuals of Roman and canon
law in their collection and had access to Gratian’s
Concordance of Discordant Canons and the Decretals of
Gregory IX, both collections of Church law.71
The authors probably did not learn about the two laws
that composed the ius commune entirely from books. The
texts were meant to be used as part of a scholastic training
67. HELMHOLZ, supra note 3, at 20.
68. See Hall, Introduction to GLANVILL, supra note 4, at xxxvi.
69. For examples, see 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 19, 299, 306.
70. See generally SELECT PASSAGES FROM THE WORKS OF BRACTON AND AZO
(Frederic William Maitland ed., 1895) (comparing the Romanesque portions of
Bracton’s treatise with Azo of Bologna’s writings).
71. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 22 (citing the Decretals of Gregory IX); id. at
27 (citing Gratian’s Decretum); see generally H.G. Richardson, Azo, Drogheda,
and Bracton, 59 ENG. HIST. REV. 22 (1944) (discussing the influence of Azo, a
teacher and a famous Summa writer in Bologna, and William of Drogheda, a
thirteenth-century Oxford canonist, on Bracton).
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program. This training would have been available to them
in several different places. Every cathedral had a school,
and depending on the schoolmaster and his background, the
cathedral might offer some training in law as part of a
general course that could also cover theology, medicine, and
the arts.72 The first universities were appearing in Europe
by the second half of the twelfth century, as well. A few
Englishmen and Normans traveled to Bologna, but from at
least the early decades of the thirteenth century, Oxford
was also an option for legal studies.73 We are fortunate that
a set of lectures on the Institutes, written in England
around the year 1200, have survived.74 Our authors may
have heard these very lectures. At the very least, they are
evidence of the interpretations of Roman law current in
England’s schools at that time, the kinds of interpretations
that the authors would have been familiar with.
That education taught the authors of these treatises to
think about law in particular ways. Law was not a collection
of court procedures; law was an internally coherent system.
Justinian’s Digest made a point of saying in one of its
introductions that it contained no contradictions.75 Gratian’s
Concordance of Discordant Canons was built around the
idea of bringing order to a disorderly collection of
authorities. Gratian placed authoritative texts that
appeared to conflict with each other side-by-side and
demonstrated that, if read properly, they did not conflict at
all.76 This scholastic method of law was characterized by a
72. NICHOLAS ORME, ENGLISH SCHOOLS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 79 (1973). The
Third Lateran Council of 1179 required that every cathedral maintain at least
one master to teach the clerics and “poor scholars.” R.W. SOUTHERN, THE
MAKING OF THE MIDDLE AGES 194 (1953).
73. Thomas Becket was sent to Bologna to study law for one year while he
was a cleric in Archbishop Theobald’s household. FRANK BARLOW, THOMAS
BECKET 36-37 (1986). By 1174, the community of English students in Bologna
was substantial enough to endow an altar dedicated to the newly canonized St.
Thomas Becket in one of the city’s churches. BRUNDAGE, supra note 66, at 224.
Oxford was already an important center of learning in the 1190s, but Cambridge
would not get off the ground as a center of studies until the 1220s or 1230s. See
id. at 238-40.
74. These lectures have been edited in TEACHING
12.

OF

ROMAN LAW, supra note

75. DIG. (Justinian, Constitutio Tanta 15).
76. See JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, MEDIEVAL CANON LAW 47 (1995).
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love of distinction, categorization, and taxonomy. Law was
divided into public and private; civil and criminal; persons,
things, and actions.77
These authors would have had little opportunity to see
Roman law in action, however. Their one opportunity might
have been the ecclesiastical courts. Those courts used canon
law and all three of the possible contributors to the Bracton
treatise held ecclesiastical benefices, which might have led
them to be involved with the church courts.78 Canon law had
adopted the language of property and possession from
Roman law and, although few records survive from the
English ecclesiastical courts in this period, the Bracton
authors could have had some experience with possessory
and proprietary actions in that setting.79 Otherwise, Roman
law was something to be learned through books and in
classrooms. Although the works of the ancient and medieval
jurists are extremely detailed and subtle—Azo’s summae
together run more than 1200 pages in their earliest printed
editions—Roman law’s flexibility in practice might have
been lost on the twelfth- and thirteenth-century justices.80
The process of bringing Roman law into court practice was a
work of legal translation; the justices were trying to learn to
speak a foreign language when they learned Roman law,
and they were working to learn the strict rules of grammar
77. See J. INST. 1.2.12, 4.18.pr-1.
78. Brand, supra note 10; David Crook, Raleigh, William of (d. 1250), in
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, http://www.oxforddnb.
com.gate.lib.buffalo.edu/view/article/23042 (last visited June 16, 2012); Alan
Harding, Pattishall, Martin of (d. 1229), in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY,
http://www.oxforddnb.com.gate.lib.buffalo.edu/view/article/21542
(last visited June 16, 2012).
79. Mary Cheney has placed the key developments in the adoption of the
language of possession and property in England’s church courts in the period
between 1140 and 1160. The distinction between possessory and proprietary
actions was certainly well-established in the ecclesiastical courts by the 1220s.
Mary Cheney, Possessio/Proprietas in Ecclesiastical Courts in mid-twelfthcentury England, in LAW AND GOVERNMENT IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND AND
NORMANDY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR JAMES HOLT 245, 253 (George Garnett &
John Hudson eds., 1994).
80. AZO, supra note 12; PETER GARNSEY & CAROLINE HUMFRESS, THE
EVOLUTION OF THE LATE ANTIQUE WORLD 60-61 (2001) (arguing that the codes
promulgated by late Roman emperors tend to make the law appear rigid and
obscure the work of local jurists and parties in working out the law on the
ground).
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rather than the flexible colloquialisms of practice.
Additionally, their knowledge of Roman law may not have
been very deep. None of these three justices is ever
described in the rolls as magister, the title usually accorded
in the records to justices who had taken degrees in the
schools.81 Their periods of training in Roman and canon law
may have been short, just long enough for major
distinctions and general principles to imprint on their
minds. Thus, as we will see, the idea of property as an
absolute right, good against the world, which the Bracton
authors took from Roman law, was adopted into the treatise
without recognition of its exceptions and qualifications at
Roman law. Their first experience applying this law would
have been when they tried to reconcile it to the workings of
the English courts, and this is when they would have begun
to work through situations where the general rules and
principles did not work very well.
The distinctions that Roman law scholars made in the
realm of property law concern us most here. In the Roman
law of the sixth century, the law of the Justinianic period,
property was not a major division of the law as it is in
modern common law. There would have been no first-year
course on property. The Institutes is divided into sections on
persons, things, and actions. The discussions of property
and possession appear primarily in the sections on things
and actions. The word thing (res) could have a broad range
of meanings at Roman law. Although it is never defined in
the Institutes, in the section on things it appears to mean
anything with which a human being can have a property
relationship, whether it be something corporeal, like a
house, or incorporeal, like a servitude or an obligation.82
81. TURNER, supra note 7, at 150, 226.
82. See generally J. INST. 2.3 (discussing servitudes); J. INST. 2.2.2 (defining
obligations and inheritances). There are some things that can be owned by no
one, but which are nevertheless things. The sea shore is the prime example. The
authors of the Institutes raise this example, however, because it is surprising
that there is a thing that can be owned by no one. In fact, as the authors of the
Institutes point out, there was a difference of opinion on the matter. While some
jurists imagined the sea shore to be owned by no one, others imagined it to be
owned by all people in common. J. INST. 2.1.5. The statement that the sea shore
is incapable of ownership is thus a legal conclusion rather than a statement
about the sea shore’s reification. It is presumably a thing and a human being
could presumably have a property relationship with it if not for the law’s
prohibition.

2012]

PROPERTY BEFORE PROPERTY

1157

It is significant that the law of things appears before the
law of actions in the text, because the law of things is not
just physically prior to the law of actions; it is also
conceptually prior to the law of actions.83 Abstract concepts
come before the concrete actions that put them into practice.
When the author of the lectures on the Institutes written in
England around the turn of the thirteenth century turns
from the law of things, which ends with a subsection on
obligations, to the law of actions, he tells us that actions are
treated after obligations because “actions . . . arise from
obligations.”84 The reader of the Institutes and the hearer of
the lectures is led to think of law not as a set of court
practices, but as an abstract system that is put into practice
through those court practices.
The medieval jurists constructed a systematic law of
property—systematized well beyond what the classical
jurists or Justinian had done—out of Justinian’s texts. In
the writings of the medieval jurists, property was ceasing to
be a concept within the law of things and was becoming a
major division of the law in its own right. The author of our
lectures on the Institutes began his commentary on the
section on things by telling us it is about property: “And so
[the section] on things concerns showing which things (res)
are subjected to our ownership (dominium, a synonym for
proprietas) and which are not.”85
The twelfth- and thirteenth-century jurists conceived of
landholding primarily through the concepts of property
(proprietas, dominium) and possession (possessio). Our
modern word property is derived from the Latin proprietas,
which is related to the Latin word propria, an adjective
83. J. INST. 2.1 (beginning of section on things); J. INST. 4.6 (beginning of
section on actions).
84. TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW, supra note 12, at 116. It is less clear whether
Roman law of the classical period—i.e., the early empire—placed concepts or
rights conceptually prior to actions. Hans Peter has argued that the classical
jurists thought primarily in terms of actions rather than rights or abstract
concepts. HANS PETER, ACTIO UND WRIT 56-57 (1957). Peter Garnsey has argued
that the jurists of the classical period were concerned with abstract rights and
had a concept of an individual, subjective right to property. PETER GARNSEY,
THINKING ABOUT PROPERTY 180-81 (2007).
85. TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW, supra note 12, at 29 (I have modified de
Zulueta and Stein’s translation) (“De Rebus itaque agit, ostendens que res
dominio nostro subiciuntur et que non.”).
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meaning “[my] own.” Proprietas is thus something that is
one’s own, and can be literally rendered into English as
ownership.86 Dominium, which is related to domus (house)
and dominus (lord), was used interchangeably with
proprietas in the Roman law texts.87
Property was a right in rem, good against all the
world.88 That is to say that the action by which one
recovered one’s property, called a vindicatio, mentioned only
the plaintiff and the thing claimed, not the defendant.89 The
question at issue was whether A was the owner of the thing,
absolutely and against all comers, not whether A had better
title in the thing than B as we would ask in modern
common law systems.90 Roman law scholars imagined
property as absolute in another way as well. Property was
the sum total of three rights that, together, gave one
absolute control of the thing, at least as the jurists imagined
absolute control. These three rights were called usus (the
right to use the thing), fructus (the right to take its fruits),
and abusus (the right to dispose of the thing).91 Jurists
thought of property as the conjunction of the three, subject
to servitudes, which might temporarily alienate the owner’s
control of the usus or fructus.92 The jurists carefully limited
the servitude to preserve the fiction that the owner was
supreme. The typical example of a servitude was the
86. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, s.v. “ownership” (2d. ed. 1991) (“The
fact or state of being an owner; legal right of possession; property,
proprietorship, dominion.”).
87. ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF ROMAN LAW 441 (1953).
88. See J. INST.4.6.1; AZO, supra note 12, at 1118; TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW,
supra note 12, at 111; D.L. Carey Miller, Property, in A COMPANION TO
JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES 42-43 (Ernest Metzger ed., 1998).
89. See J. INST.4.6.1; AZO, supra note 12, at 1118; TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW,
supra note 12, at 111; see also Miller, supra note 88, at 47 (“The right of
ownership is protected by a vindicatory action . . . . The applicable form of
procedure involved the assertion of a claim to the actual thing.”).
90. Ernest Metzger, Actions, in A COMPANION TO JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES 218
(Ernest Metzger ed., 1998); Miller, supra note 88, at 45 (“[O]wnership is a
distinct paramount right rather than a mere label attaching to the most
compelling of two or more competing claims to a thing.”).
91. TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW, supra note 12, at 35 (discussing the right to use
and the right to take the fruits as part of the usufruct); Miller, supra note 88, at
45.
92. See J. INST. 2.4.pr-1.
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usufruct, which combined usus and fructus.93 The usufruct
left the owner with only the abusus, but the usus and the
fructus could only be alienated for short periods of time94.
The owner could specify that the usufruct would last for a
specific amount of time or for the usufructuary’s life. In
either event, the usufruct returned to the owner no later
than the usufructuary’s death; it could not be passed to
anyone else by sale, gift, or inheritance.95 These restrictions
on alienation preserved property’s status as the absolute
right in the minds of jurists.96 Thus, the simple, take-home
message of most Roman law texts was that property was an
absolute, indivisible right good against the world. The
English justices seem to have picked up this message.
Property was contrasted with possession: according to
the Digest, “property has nothing in common with
possession.”97 Property was an abstract legal right.
Possession was the actual control of the land. Property was
protected by an action. Possession was protected by an
interdict, a type of procedure that was not properly
considered an action by the jurists.98 Where property was
absolute, possession was relative. If A was put out of
possession of his land by B, he could sue B on a possessory
interdict. The interdict would decide only who, between A
and B, had possession. It did not decide A’s rights against C
or anyone else.99 We know that the Bracton authors were
familiar with the bright line between possession and
property because they quote the Digest’s insistence that the
two have nothing in common twice.100 Other Roman legal
texts did not distinguish quite so clearly. Azo, for instance,

93. See J. INST. 2.3-4; AZO, supra note, 12 at 1072.
94. See Miller, supra note 88, at 67.
95. See J. INST. 2.4.4; Miller, supra note 88, at 67.
96. See ALAN RODGER, OWNERS AND NEIGHBOURS IN ROMAN LAW 2 (1972) (“For
the Pandectists ownership is in essence unrestricted and any limitations which
may be placed on it are somehow alien to it and detract from its purity . . . .”).
97. DIG. 41.2.12 (my translation) (“Nihil commune habet proprietas cum
possession . . . .”).
98. See Metzger, supra note 90, at 210.
99. See TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW, supra note 12, at 111.
100. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 321; 3 id. at 325.
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defines actions in rem as actions based on possession.101
Despite the jurists’ insistence that possession was a matter
of fact rather than of law it was a fact with important legal
significance. Possession had the potential, just as it does in
modern law, to become an abstract legal construct. The
classic American property case, Pierson v. Post, raised the
question of whether a person obtained possession of a fox
when he began to pursue it, when he had a reasonable
chance of killing it, when he killed it, or when he held it in
his hands.102 Only in the last of these cases can we
unequivocally say that the fox-hunter has the fox in his
physical control, but any of the others could, potentially, be
labeled possession. Roman law, which is the source of the
common law doctrine of possession, could similarly treat
someone who is not in control as a matter of fact as the
possessor. For transfer of possession, Roman law required
that the possessor give up his possession corpore et animo,
by body and by mind, meaning that he physically give up
possession and intend to give up possession.103 Say, however,
the possessor, A, is physically ejected from his land by B. A
no longer has possession corpore; he has no physical control
of the land at all. He is still legally the possessor, however,
because he never surrendered possession animo.104
Possession in this case can hardly be said to be a mere fact.
It is a legal right, and, according to Justinian’s texts, A
could sue B using the interdict unde vi to recover his land.105
The doctrine that one had to possess both animo and
corpore was appealing to the Bracton authors, who used it
throughout the treatise.
The authors of Glanvill and Bracton were writing
within a tradition that saw the ius commune as a universal
law and saw English court practices as part of that larger
101. AZO, supra note 12, at 1119 (“There are however those [actions] in rem,
which are given against anyone by reason of possession, i.e., because he has the
thing, or possesses it.”) (my translation) (“Sunt autem illae in rem, quae dantur
contra aliquem ratione possessionis, id est, quia habet rem, vel possidet.”).
102. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. 1805).
103. AZO, supra note 12, at 740. The corpore et animo requirement has been
incorporated into the common law of gifts, which require both delivery and
intent to make a gift.
104. Id. at 740.
105. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 296.
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ius commune.106 Ius commune was the system of which
English custom was a local instantiation. We are not
accustomed to think about the early common law this way
because civil law is generally seen, and sees itself, as
common law’s opposite. On the common law side, scholars
have worked hard to explain why England was so unique in
its legal development.107 Somehow the English royal courts
resisted the reception of Romano-canonical procedure that
occurred in places like France and Italy in the thirteenth
century and the more widespread reception of Roman

106. Manlio Bellomo has made similar arguments for other parts of Europe.
Bellomo has argued that historians who see the ius commune as merely a
subsidiary law, to be cited only when no appropriate local law could be found on
point, do so because they inappropriately treat the ius commune as a positive
law. Bellomo demonstrates that, rather than providing specific rules and laws,
ius commune provided a set of unchanging structures and principles through
which jurists could interpret the ius proprium, the local law of the place. The ius
commune was the unchanging form of law and the ius proprium was the
instantiation of that form. MANLIO BELLOMO, THE COMMON LEGAL PAST OF
EUROPE 1000-1800, at 152-53 (Lydia G. Cochrane trans., 1995). Bellomo
specifically treats the Sicilian Liber Augustalis of 1231, which created a
hierarchy among laws. A judge deciding a case was to turn to the law of the
kingdom first. If there was no royal law on point, he could then turn to the
customs of the locality. If neither of those provided the answer, only then could
he turn to ius commune. The ius commune thus comes last, as a subsidiary law
to be used only when all local law has run out. Bellomo points out that it is only
the specific provisions of Roman and canon law that the Liber Augustalis places
in an inferior position to ius proprium. The structures, principles, and
terminology of the ius commune infused all of the laws of the kingdom of Sicily,
including the Liber Augustalis itself, which is heavily influenced by Roman law.
Id. at 89-94.
107. See J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 28 (4th ed.
2002) (arguing that Roman law found a highly developed legal system that was
difficult to supplant when it arrived in England in the twelfth and sixteenth
centuries); R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 90-92
(2d ed. 1988) (arguing that England’s period of legal development pre-dated the
continent’s by half a century and produced a workable court system before
Roman influence could reach England); see also 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK AND
FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF
EDWARD I 135 (2d ed. 1898) [hereinafter POLLOCK & MAITLAND] (“Our English
law shows itself strong enough to assimilate foreign ideas and convert them to
its own use. Of any wholesale ‘reception’ of Roman law there is no danger. From
the day at Clarendon onwards it is plain that we have many consuetudines
which must be maintained in the teeth of leges and canones.”).
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substantive law in later centuries.108 An oft-quoted
explanation was offered by the German scholar Heinrich
Brunner around the turn of the twentieth century. Brunner
thought that England had received a bit of Roman law early
on, in Henry II’s reforms and in texts like the Bracton
treatise, and that this small reception of Roman law had
“operated as a sort of prophylactic inoculation, and had
rendered the national law immune against destructive
infection.”109 “Prophylactic” generally has a more specific
meaning today than it did in Brunner’s time, making it an
unfortunate choice of words for reasons that Brunner
probably could not have foreseen. This metaphor, which
gives us an inherently negative view of civil law, has been
repeated in much more recent common law histories.110
When historians of the common law repeat the prophylactic
metaphor in a world where we associate common law with
England and civil law with the continent it conjures up
images of the seductive civil law threatening to infect the
common law with the wicked French disease.
It is not only its highly negative attitude towards civil
law that makes this metaphor inapt. The metaphor
assumes that the common law was a healthy body that
could be invaded by civil law in the thirteenth century. It is
essentially a backward-looking view of history, coming at
the problem from the situation in the modern world, where
common law and civil law are two competing systems that
could potentially infect (or influence, to paint it in a less
negative light) each other. This was not the case in twelfthand thirteenth-century England. The royal justices did not
yet think of the procedures followed in the royal courts as a
unified common law; the expression ley commune would not
make its first appearances until the end of the thirteenth
century.111 Rather, like their civilian counterparts, they
thought of their law as part of an international ius
commune. We can see this clearly in the Bracton treatise. In
the introduction to that text, one of the text’s authors, this
108. See EDWARD PETERS, INQUISITION 52-53 (1988); see generally GERALD
STRAUSS, LAW, RESISTANCE, AND THE STATE: THE OPPOSITION TO ROMAN LAW IN
REFORMATION GERMANY (1986).
109. See Heinrich Brunner, The Sources of English Law, in SELECT ESSAYS
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 42 (1908).
110. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 107, at 28.
111. See Brand, supra note 14, at 21.
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one probably Henry de Bratton himself, says that “though
in almost all lands use is made of the leges and the jus
scriptum, England alone uses unwritten law and custom.
There law derives from nothing written [but] from what
usage has approved.”112 Bratton presents England as a lone
holdout in a world that he imagines to be populated by
textualized law. Of course, this is manifestly untrue. Very
little of Western Christendom used ius scriptum.113 Yet, the
author chooses to present England as unique in not using
written law.
In this passage, Bratton is actually using the language
of the ius commune to highlight England’s difference from
it. He uses the terms leges (laws) and ius scriptum (written
law) in the same way they are used in texts like the
Institutes and Gratian’s Decretum. The word lex is used
throughout the Bracton treatise to refer specifically to
Roman law.114 The clearest case appears in the tractate on
acquiring dominion over things, a portion of the text which
was probably written by the royal justice William of Ralegh
during one of the early phases of writing on the treatise.115
In one passage from this tractate, Ralegh tells us that “until
the felony is proved, the land of a felon can never be the
112. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 19 (“Cum autem fere in omnibus regionibus
utatur legibus et iure scripto, sola Anglia usa est in suis finibus iure non scripto
et consuetudine.”). For the argument that Henry de Bratton wrote the
introductio to the text, see Brand, The Age of Bracton, supra note 8, at 77.
113. Bratton may have known of a few recent attempts to create royal
statutory compilations comparable, at least in the minds of their authors, with
Justinian’s collection of imperial legislation, the Codex. Frederick II of Sicily
had issued his Liber Augustalis in 1231. Alfonso X of Castile and León issued
the Fuero Real between 1252 and 1255, a failed attempt to create a law for his
whole kingdom. The kings of France issued ordonnances at various points in the
thirteenth century, but no more often than the kings of England issued assizes
or statuta. In Northern France, the area of the world with which the English
had the most contact, law remained largely unwritten in the 1250s. BELLOMO,
supra note 106, at 93, 100, 104.
114. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 19.
115. This tractate contains addiciones, or accretions to the text, that contradict
the main text. This leads me to believe that it was written in the earlier stages
of writing, when Ralegh was working on the treatise, and revised by one of the
later authors, perhaps Henry de Bratton. At one point in the tractate, for
instance, the main text says “the services must be certain and expressed in
writing.” Id. at 62. To which someone has added, “or without a writing,”
changing the meaning of the passage substantially. Id.
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escheat of the chief lord” and that, in this rule, “law (lex)
agrees with English custom (consuetudo Anglicana): ff. de
donationibus l. post contractum [this is a citation to
Justinian’s Digest, D. 39.5.15], where it is said that gifts
made after the commission of a capital crime are valid
unless condemnation follows.”116 Ralegh is familiar with the
distinction made in Roman and canon law texts between lex,
which is written, and mos or consuetudo (custom), which is
unwritten.117 He is clearly distinguishing between the
written lex and the unwritten consuetudo in this passage,
but he sees the two as being in accord with each other.
Ralegh makes another important distinction in this
passage: he feels the need to modify the word custom with
the adjective English. The word lex, however, requires no
modifier. He does not need to specify that the lex he refers
to is Roman law, even though he makes it clear immediately
afterwards that he is referring to the Digest. Roman law is
just lex; it is the one, universal written law. This passage is
not an outlier. Many other portions of the treatise use the
term lex to refer to provisions of the Digest and the Codex,
and both Ralegh and Bratton speak about Roman law as if
it was binding authority in England.118
116. Id. at 101. (I have modified Thorne’s translation) (“[C]onvenit lex cum
consuetudine Anglicana, ff. de donationibus l. post contractum, ubi dicitur quod
post contractum capitale crimen donationes factae valent nisi condemnatio
subsecuta sit.”).
117. See J.INST.1.2.3 (“Written law (ius scriptum) is lex [followed by several
other categories of written law]. . . .”); J.INST.1.2.9 (“Law (ius) comes into being
without a writing (ex non scripto) when a rule is approved by use.”) (Translation
by Peter Birks and Grant McLeod); D.1 c.5 (“Custom, however, is a kind of ius
instituted by usage.”). Isidore of Seville, an author with whom the Bracton
authors were certainly familiar, and who they quote, 3 BRACTON, supra note 5,
at 151, and id. at 360, may have actually been Ralegh and Bratton’s source for
the distinction. See ISIDORE OF SEVILLE, ETYMOLOGIAE 5.3.2-3 (“Lex is a written
constitution. Mos is custom proved by age, or unwritten lex. For lex is called
from legendo, because it is written. Mos however is long custom (longa
consuetudo) . . . . Consuetudo, however is ius instituted by customs (moribus),
which is received for lex, when lex is lacking.”) (my translation) (“Lex est
constitutio scripta. Mos est vetustate probata consuetudo, sive lex non scripta.
Nam lex a legendo vocata, quia scripta est. Mos autem longa consuetudo est . . .
. Consuetudo autem est ius quoddam moribus institutum, quod pro lege
suscipitur, cum deficit lex.”).
118. See, e.g., 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 305. (using lex to mean a Roman
statute); id. at 323 (several direct citations to the Digest referred to by the term
lex as part of an addition to the text that was probably made by Henry de
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The fact that lex has a specific meaning in the treatise
makes Bratton’s choice of it in the introduction all the more
significant. He presents England and its law as exceptional.
England was the lone holdout in a world that used written,
Roman law. But then Bratton turns to defending English
law’s place within the international legal order that was
defined by the ius commune. Quoting Glanvill, he explains
that:
Nevertheless, it will not be absurd to call English laws leges,
though they are unwritten, since whatever has been rightly
decided and approved with the counsel and consent of the
magnates and the general agreement of the res publica, the
authority of the king or prince having first been added
119
thereto, has the force of a [lex].

Bratton places himself on the edge of a Roman and canon
law culture of written law and tries to convince the reader
that England is a part of it, albeit in an unconventional
way. English law can be described as lex, the universal law
of the ius commune, even though it is unwritten. The
language that makes common law and civil law into two
competing systems belongs to a later era.
The treatise writers of the late twelfth and early
thirteenth centuries were administrators, landholding
elites, and legal scholars and, as such, had to be conversant
in all three languages. But these three languages contained
some inherent contradictions, and, as we shall see, the
authors of treatises worked hard, but unsuccessfully, to
reduce the dissonance between the languages they were
required to speak.
II. MIXING THE LANGUAGES: THE GLANVILL TREATISE
The treatise we generally call Glanvill is titled, in many
of its manuscripts, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni
Angliae (On the Laws and Customs of the Realm of

Bratton); id. at 367 (using lex to refer to an excerpt from an ancient Roman
jurist found in the Digest).
119. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 19 (“Sed non erit absurdum leges Anglicanas
licet non scriptas leges appellare, cum legis vigorem habeat quidquid de consilio
et consensu magnatum et rei publicæ communi sponsione, auctoritate regis sive
principis præcedente, iuste fuerit definitum et approbatum.”).
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England).120 It was written ca. 1187–1189.121 The name
Glanvill comes from the royal justiciar at the time of its
writing, who is mentioned in some of the manuscripts as its
author, although the attribution is dubious.122 Glanvill is a
Latin text which describes the procedures of the king’s
court. Written a decade after the end of Henry II’s busiest
period of reform, it is the earliest source we have for many
of the writs that became so important to the common law.
Glanvill also makes an early effort to translate English
practice into the language of Roman law. The author takes
the words seisin and right, words that appeared in the
Anglo-French vernacular and in the language of writs, and
equate them, in a direct one-to-one fashion, with the Roman
law terms possession and property. Early in the treatise, he
distinguishes between pleas that “concern solely claims to
the property in the disputed subject-matter” and pleas
where “the claim is based on possession.”123 On the
possession side of the line, he places all those pleas “which
are determined by recognitions,” meaning primarily those
assizes that historians of English law know so well—novel
disseisin,
mort
d’ancestor,
utrum,
and
darrein
presentment—and tells us that these “will be discussed
later in their proper place.”124 When he gets to the proper
place, book XIII on recognitions, he does not use the division
between possession and property that he used in the
introduction to his work. Instead, he says that he has dealt
with “pleas about right” (placita de recto) and is now
turning to recognitions, which are concerned “with seisins
only.”125 The Romanist language of possession (possessio)
and property (proprietas) that the author began with has
morphed into the language of seisin (saisina) and right

120. GLANVILL, supra note 4, at 1.
121. Hall, Introduction to GLANVILL, supra note 4, at xi.
122. Id. at xxx-xxxiii.
123. GLANVILL, supra note 4, at 4.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 148 (I have modified Hall’s translation). Hall translates this phrase
as “with seisin only,” but the Latin word he translates as “seisin,” saisinis, is
plural. I would like to thank John Hudson for pointing this out to me.
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(rectum), terms that would have made sense in the
vernacular.126
The Glanvill author understood Roman law well enough
to see the similarities between the words seisin and right of
their writs and Roman law’s possession and property. The
comparison may have made sense to him for several
reasons. First of all, in the way the words were used by the
Anglo-Norman landed elite, being seised was something
that happened in an instant, when the donor of the land
invested the donee. Right was generally tied to a
generational claim, that the land had belonged to the family
for a long time.127 This mirrored the Roman law of
prescription, as described by Azo and our English lecturer
on Roman law, by which one’s possession could mature into
a property right.128 Likewise, writs that dealt with seisin
generally had quicker, simpler procedures associated with
them than writs that dealt with right.129 In the same way,
Roman actions on the possession were much quicker and
simpler than actions on property.130 This made perfect sense
in both cases. The action on the right or property decided
more than the action on the seisin or the possession and
generally precluded the parties from bringing any future
action. So the losing party in a writ of right could not bring
126. This is not the only place in the treatise that the author makes it clear
that he equates the Roman possession with the Anglo-French seisin and the
Roman property with the Anglo-French right. He also speaks of pleas brought
“on the question of property by means of a writ of right (breve de recto)” which
he parallels later with the phrase “except on the question of right (recto) by . . . a
writ of right.” Id. at 6, 10.
127. Hudson makes the point, for instance, that landholders felt more free to
alienate land, without the lord’s permission, that had been inherited than land
that had been acquired during one’s lifetime, since, with acquired land, the
landholder’s relationship with the lord who had given him the land was still
strong. As the land was inherited over several generations, though, the
connection between land and lord became more attenuated and the connection
between land and family became stronger. Contemporaries might have put this
in terms of an increase in right. See HUDSON, supra note 26, at 209.
128. See AZO, supra note 12, at 731-39; TEACHING
12, at 37.

OF

ROMAN LAW, supra note

129. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 39, at 35.
130. Frederic Joüon des Longrais, La portée politiques des réformes d’Henry II
en matière de saisine, Quatrieme série, xv REVUE HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRANÇAIS
ET ETRANGER 565-67 (1936).
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another writ of right but also could not bring a novel
disseisin.131 The reverse was not true. The loser in a novel
disseisin case could bring a writ of right. So the procedure
on the right or property had to be more rigorous than that
on the seisin or possession. Frederic Joüon des Longrais
called this type of procedure the “double action” (double
procès) where there is a simple action for easy cases and a
more complicated action for hard ones.132 He was among a
group of historians who thought this was evidence that
Henry II and his councilors had copied Roman models when
they created the petty assizes and the writs of right,
although he thought their borrowing did not go beyond the
idea of having a double action.133 There is no real reason,
apart from this similarity, to believe that copying was
involved.134 The fact that the English writs and Roman
actions had this double action in common, though, certainly
encouraged the authors of texts like Glanvill, authors who
were inclined to make comparisons between English and
Roman law, to treat their writs as if they were Roman
131. See David J. Seipp, Roman Legal Categories in the Early Common Law,
in LEGAL RECORD AND HISTORICAL REALITY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH BRITISH
LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE 9, 25 (Thomas G. Watkin ed., 1989).
132. Joüon des Longrais, supra note 130, at 567.
133. See id. at 555. (“If Roman influence appears undeniable in the appearance
of the double action, it seems not to have guided the reforms of seisin in their
details.”) (my translation).
134. Mary Cheney has demonstrated that the ecclesiastical courts in England
were making use of the distinction between possessory and proprietary actions
by 1160. Since royal servants in clerical orders might sit in judgment in
ecclesiastical courts and great magnates might have their disputes heard in
those courts, there were opportunities for Henry II’s councilors to become aware
of the distinction. See Cheney, supra note 79, at 252-53. It is important to note,
however, that none of the early writs use any language borrowed from Roman or
canon law and our first evidence that anyone was thinking of them as parallels
to Roman actions comes from the Glanvill treatise, written a decade to a
generation after most of the writs had been created. Joshua Tate has argued
that, by looking at the assize of darrein presentment, we can see Roman and
canon law influence more clearly than we can in assizes that concern lay fees.
The problems of lordship that are present in the assizes of novel disseisin and
mort d’ancestor are absent from darrein presentment, which concerns the right
to present to a church. See Tate, supra note 54, at 307-09. The problem with this
argument is that darrein presentment probably post-dated novel disseisin and
mort d’ancestor, and may simply have been based on those writs, not on Roman
or canon law. See id. at 307.
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actions and to treat seisin and right as if they were
possession and property.
Even if the Glanvill author could see parallels between
English writs and the Roman law of possession and
property, he did not try to work the writs into anything like
a systematic law of property in the style of medieval Roman
law. The Glanvill author does divide his treatise into
sections on pleas on the property and pleas on the
possession, but his discussion centers not on substantive
law doctrines like property and possession, but on the writs
that were administered by the royal courts.135 He follows
what Maitland called a “dilemmatic” method;136 he starts
with a fact pattern that might come before the royal courts
and then subdivides that fact pattern, creating a sort of
decision tree for the justice sitting in court:
If the tenant chooses to defend himself by battle against the
demandant, then the procedure is as stated above. But if the
tenant prefers to put himself upon the lord king’s Grand
Assize, then the demandant will either do the same, or he will
not. . . . But if he is unwilling to put himself upon the assize he
must show some cause why there should be no assize between
them. . . . If the demandant makes this objection, the tenant
137
will either admit it or not.

The author’s concern is not with a systematic set of
laws, but with what the royal justice must do depending on
the decisions of the parties before him. It is a very practical
exposition of the workings of the king’s courts, not a
systematic exposition of a field of law. If we were to use the
categorizations of Roman law, we would say he was
thinking in terms of procedural, not substantive, law. I do
not think that these categorizations are appropriate for
Glanvill, though, because he almost certainly was not
thinking about it that way. His is an administrator’s
mentality. The text itself is not all that different from the
Dialogue of the Exchequer, a text on financial
administration written around the same time.138
135. Hall, Introduction to GLANVILL, supra note 4, at xxii.
136. See 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 107, at 166.
137. GLANVILL, supra note 4, at 26.
138. See MICHAEL CLANCHY, FROM MEMORY TO WRITTEN RECORD: ENGLAND
1066-1307, at 18-19 (2d ed. 1993) (comparing Glanvill to the Dialogue as two
manuals that attempted to describe administrative procedures in general ways).
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III. TOWARD A SYSTEM OF PROPERTY: THE BRACTON TREATISE
The Glanvill author seems to have had some sense that
his law was part of the larger system of ius commune. The
authors of Bracton show a much deeper commitment to this
idea. Bracton, like Justinian’s Institutes, is divided into
sections on persons, things, and actions.139 The author of the
treatise’s first introduction, probably Henry de Bratton,
calls it a summa, which was a genre of writing current in
the Roman and canon law faculties in the universities.140 As
I have argued elsewhere, the Bracton authors were much
more heavily invested in Roman law because the ideology of
medieval Roman law served their professional interests.141
The author of Glanvill was writing in a period when the
royal administration was not specialized, and when the
people who worked in the royal courts might also be great
magnates, work in the exchequer, or serve as clerks in the
royal household.142 They were jacks of all trades who sat as
justices part-time, as one among many roles they filled.143
The Bracton authors were a new type of justice. They had
served long apprenticeships as clerks to justices before
being elevated to the bench themselves.144 William of Ralegh
was Martin of Pattishall’s clerk for at least fifteen years
when he became a justice of the common bench in 1229.145
Henry de Bratton was William of Ralegh’s clerk before he
139. The authors divided the treatise this way even though the section on
actions, which is the shortest of Justinian’s sections, fills almost the whole of the
treatise. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 29 (“[T]he whole of the law with which we
propose to deal relates either to persons or to things or to actions, according to
English laws and customs.”); id. (beginning of section on persons); id. at 39
(beginning of section on things); id. at 282 (beginning of section on actions,
which runs for more than two volumes in the modern edition); J. INST.1.2.12
(“All the law that we use, however, pertains either to persons, or to things, or to
actions.”) (my translation) (“Omne autem ius, quo utimur, vel ad personas
pertinent vel ad res vel ad actiones.”).
140. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 19.
141. Thomas J. McSweeney, English Justices and Roman Jurists: The Civilian
Learning Behind England’s First Case Law, 84 TEMPLE L. REV. (forthcoming);
McSweeney, supra note 6, at 4-5.
142. Id.
143. See TURNER, supra note 7, at 39.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 237.
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became a justice.146 A great deal of a man like Henry de
Bratton’s identity must have been bound up in the fact that
he was a royal justice. Roman law was essentially a new
technology that spoke to that identity. It provided the
justices with a language for talking about the work they
were doing as something superior to the other parts of the
royal administration. They were jurists, servants of an
impersonal law, priests of justice, as one of the Bracton
authors put it, not the king’s accountants.147 For the author
of Glanvill, Roman law was useful to the extent that it could
provide him with a few technical terms; for the authors of
Bracton, it provided them with an identity.
The treatise is, as mentioned, divided on the model of
Justinian’s sixth-century legal textbook, the Institutes, into
sections on persons, things, and actions. Within these broad
sections it is divided into tractates on specific subjects. The
law of property is found in the same places in Bracton as it
is in the Institutes, in the sections on things and actions.
Within the law of things, Bracton contains a tractate on
acquiring dominion over things, which mirrors a section of
the Institutes.148 This contains many of the doctrines of
occupation, capture, and gift that have become staples of
the common law of property.149 Property also finds a
prominent place in Bracton’s section on actions, which is
divided into tractates on individual writs and procedural
topics that cut across writs.150 The Institutes’s section on
actions contains quite a bit of that text’s systematic
discussion of property. It is even more prominent in
Bracton’s section on actions, however, because all of the
writs it discusses deal with landed wealth in one way or
another.
These tractates show us that the authors of Bracton
clearly knew of the tradition of equating right with property
and seisin with possession, but they show a discomfort with
the straight equation between the Roman and Anglo-French

146. Id. at 216.
147. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 24. This passage is an allusion to a
passage from Azo of Bologna’s Summa Codicis. AZO, supra note 12, at 1047.
148. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 42-281; J. INST. 2.7-.25.
149. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 42, 44, 47-48.
150. See id. at 282.
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terms that the Glanvill author had used.151 The Bracton
authors knew enough about Roman law and the practice of
the English royal courts to see that this one-to-one equation
would not work. Although writs that used the word seisin
and writs that used the word right might be equivalent to
Roman actions on the possession and the property to the
limited extent that both systems used a double action, once
the Bracton authors explored the substantive law of Roman
possession and property more deeply, they found that
reconciling the two systems would require a much more
complex scheme. The Roman law the justices had learned
dealt in absolute rights and abstract concepts. The
procedures they administered in the courts dealt in concrete
disputes between real people. In some cases the abstract
theories of Roman law and the concrete practices of the
English courts came to different conclusions. Both, however,
had to be correct as far as the justices were concerned. They
could not stray too far from the practices of the English
courts, but Roman law was a universal law. The dilemma
resembles the problems modern physicists have reconciling
classical physics with quantum mechanics. The former
works very well on the macro level; the latter works very
well on the micro level. It has proved difficult to develop a
unified theory that reconciles the two, however. The justices
who wrote Bracton were trying to develop a unified theory
of law. They maintained their investment in demonstrating
equivalence between English and Roman law even as it
must have become apparent to them that this would not
work. In the process, they created several schemes for
understanding landholding that fit possession and property
together with seisin and right in increasingly contradictory
and absurdly complex ways. We will now turn to three of
those schemes.
A. The Causae of Possession
In the tractate on acquiring dominion over things, a
section of the treatise that was probably written primarily
by William of Ralegh sometime before 1236, Ralegh
discusses a gift made by someone who has no right in the
thing he is giving (i.e., what happens when William gives
151. They refer to the assize of novel disseisin as a possessory interdict and
distinguish it from a vindicatio, or writ of right, for instance. Id. at 294.
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away land that actually belongs to Ranulf?).152 As part of
this discussion, he presents us with our first scheme for
thinking about the relationship between the Roman law of
property and English court practice. Ralegh tells us that, “A
thing may be entirely and in every way another’s, with
respect to the right and the property, the fee and the free
tenement, the usufruct and the bare use.”153 These six
interests—right, property, fee, free tenement, usufruct, and
bare use—add up to the greatest power one can have over a
piece of land, since they make the land “entirely and in
every way” (omnino et ex toto) the other person’s land.154 It is
a curious list, drawn from all three languages of
landholding. Right (ius in this instance) was a term in use
in all three languages. It could have come to the author
through the writ of right, through Roman law, or through
the vernacular, as a translation of dreit. Property is clearly
a Roman law term. Fee and free tenement were in use in the
Anglo-Norman vocabulary of landholding; they often appear
in charters. The fact that Ralegh places them side-by-side
and makes such a clear distinction between the two
indicates that he was probably thinking more specifically of
their use in two different writs, the assize of mort d’ancestor
and the assize of novel disseisin. Usufruct and bare use
(nudum usus) are again terms drawn from Roman law
texts. Ralegh is combining three different ways of speaking
about the relationship between human beings and land into
one set of interests.155 Somehow these six things connect a
person to a piece of land, and when all are present, make it

152. There are several references to the statute of Merton of 1236 in this
tractate, but they appear to be later additions to bring the text up to date. One
is placed in the middle of a long excerpt from Glanvill and another between two
sentences that appear to have been consecutive at one point, indicating that the
main text was written before 1236 and needed to be updated. See id. at 179, 276;
3 Thorne, supra note 8, at xiii.
153. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 101.
154. Id. at 101.
155. This is not the only version of the list the authors give. See id. at 123
(“the right and the property, the fee and the free tenement and seisin”); id. at
127 (“[T]he [pure] right and the property, the fee and the free tenement and the
usufruct.”). I have modified Thorne’s translation of “merum ius” from “mere
right” to “pure right” because the meaning of the word mere has shifted since
the thirteenth century from “pure” to “nothing more than.”
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his “entirely and in every way.”156 But how do they connect
the person to the land? What are these interests?
Elsewhere in the tractate on acquiring dominion,
Ralegh names them causae possidendi, “causes of (or
reasons for) possession.” The terminology comes from the
Digest.157 He tells us that if A makes a gift of a piece of land
to B, A may change B’s causa possidendi without making a
new grant
as where, having first granted a usufruct for a term he may
grant his tenant a free tenement, without livery [a ritual by
which one person transferred seisin to another], by force of a
new causa. If at first [it was] for a term of life and as a free
158
tenement, he may change the causa to one in fee.

Ralegh imagines the landholder to have possession or seisin
of the land itself. The causa is the interest that legitimates
his possession of the land for a particular purpose. Once the
donor has been put in physical possession, the causa of that
possession can be changed without the ritual formalities
that usually accompanied land transfers because the
possession itself has not changed hands.159 The author does
not treat the causae as abstract property rights that can
themselves be possessed. He speaks of possession of the
land under a causa, not possession of a causa.160
The causae are separable from each other and, in fact,
different people may hold the land by each of the causae at
the same time, as
one may have the right and the property and the fee in a free
tenement and another the free tenement. One may have the
fee and free tenement and another the [pure] right. One may
have all these and another the usufruct. One may have all
161
these and the use and another the fruits.

156. Id. at 101.
157. DIG. 41.2.3.19 (Paulus, Ad Edictum 54) (“Illud quoque a veteribus
praeceptum est neminem sibi ipsum causam possessionis mutare posse.”).
158. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 140 (modification in the original).
159. See id. at 138.
160. See id. (“Two possessions of the same thing are not repugnant to one
another provided they arise from different causae.”).
161. 3 Id. at 132; see also 2 id. at 102 (“A thing may be in small part one’s own
and in greater part another’s, as where one has a free tenement in a thing and
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They are, therefore, not just greater or lesser versions of the
same right to the land. Each one must have distinguishing
features so that the holder of a free tenement in a piece of
land, for example, holds something different from the
person who holds the fee in that same land. The authors of
the Bracton treatise give us hints as to what each of these
causae mean, and they define them largely in terms of
duration.162 The bare use is difficult to untangle in the
context of the treatise. The author of the lectures on the
Institutes written in England around 1200 distinguished
clearly between the bare use and the usufruct in terms of
the rights to use and enjoy the land, but the authors of
Bracton do not seem to have thought very deeply about the
distinction between these two causae, often associating the
two and even more often leaving the bare use off of the list
altogether.163 One passage divides the usufruct from uses
which are “called bare” in that the person who holds a
usufruct holds it for a certain term, such as a term of years,
while the holder of a bare use can be ejected at any time.164
The distinguishing feature of the bare use is thus that it has
no fixed duration.165 The owner can end it at any time. The
distinguishing feature of the usufruct is the right to hold
the land for a set term, a form of landholding that was
common in England.166 Terms were used for land pledged to
creditors. Likewise, holding land in wardship could be
described as a term of years by thirteenth-century authors;
another the property and the fee, as where a doweress is in possession, or
another holding for life by gift, or by the law of England, or until provision be
made for him and the like.”).
162. This division according to duration bears similarity to the later system of
Common law estates, which also divide up the bundle of rights in land according
to their duration, a similarity that I will develop further in Part IV.
163. See TEACHING OF ROMAN LAW, supra note 12, at 35.
164. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 102, 123.
165. The bare use seems to be similar to the modern tenancy at will or license.
166. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 101, 106, 140; 3 id. at 97, 161, 268, 27375. The authors sometimes follow Roman jurists in defining the usufruct as the
right to use (usus) and enjoy the fruits (fructus) of the land, as the Roman law
texts do. Id. at 138; see also id. at 92 (“Indeed the farmer can vindicate nothing
except the usufruct, namely that which he can use freely and take the fruits
from without impediment from the feoffor.”) (I have modified Thorne’s
translation) (“[F]irmarius vero nihil sibi vindicare poterit nisi usumfructum,
scilicet quod libere uti posset et sine impedimento feoffati percipere fructum.”).
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when a tenant died with a minor heir, his lord was entitled
to hold the land, as guardian, until the heir attained
majority.167
The authors define the free tenement as a longer causa
than the usufruct: the free tenement is for life.168 There were
several ways in which a person might hold for life. A widow
was entitled to one-third of the lands her husband had held
in demesne for the remainder of her life. A widower was
entitled to hold any land his wife had during the marriage
“for life . . . by the law of England” if a child had been born
to the couple, an arrangement that was later called
curtsey.169 Life holdings could also be used to manage the
way land passed at a person’s death. We see many cases
from the thirteenth century, often contested, where a
landholder put someone else in seisin of his land, but
reserved the land to himself for the rest of his life.170
The word fee could have two meanings, both of which
appear in Bracton. In a general sense, a fee could simply be
a piece of land, and the authors of the treatise use it in this
way at times.171 In a more specific sense, it was a piece of
land that was heritable.172 In the lists of causae it is used in
this more specific sense: the fee was greater than the free
tenement because, like the later fee simple, it did not end
167. REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 368-69.
168. The authors do define it, as one might expect, in terms of freedom: we are
told that it is called free to distinguish it from villein, or unfree, tenure, which is
not protected by the king’s courts. See 3 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 171.
169. 4 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 360; BAKER, supra note 107, at 271.
170. See, e.g., British National Archives MS JUST 1/1182, m. 4, THE ANGLOAMERICAN LEGAL TRADITION, available at http://aalt.law.uh.edu/AALT3/JUST1/
JUST1no1182/aJUST1no1182fronts/IMG_0652.htm (last visited June 21, 2012)
(recording the case of the manor of Dulverton, heard by Henry de Bratton,
where Richard of Turbervill attempted to disinherit his brother by putting
someone else in seisin while remaining in control of the land for life); see also 2
BRACTON, supra note 5, at 107 (“If one [who] has both rights, property and
possession, grants both to another, attaching this modus to his gift, that after a
time the possession revert to him to be held for life . . . .”).
171. Hyams, supra note 28; see also 3 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 275 (“Fee is
also used in another sense, from the point of view of one who enfeoffs another,
what one holds of another, as where one says ‘such a one holds so many fees of
me by knight service.’”).
172. Id. at 274 (a fee is “what one holds . . . to his heirs”).
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with the death of the holder.173 The writs bear this out. The
assize of mort d’ancestor gave an action to the nearest heir
of the last person who had been “seised in . . . demesne as of
fee.”174 Where the assize of novel disseisin, which was not
concerned with heritability of land, used the words free
tenement to describe the land, the assize of mort d’ancestor
used the word fee. The authors draw the distinction between
the heritable fee and the non-heritable free tenement
throughout the treatise. For instance, the tractate on the
assize of mort d’ancestor, which may bear the mark of both
Ralegh and Bratton, tells us in another version of the
causae that:
one may be seised of land or a rent in his demesne as of fee
and as of free tenement, or only as of fee and not in demesne,
or only as of a free tenement, in demesne but not in fee, as
175
may be said of those who hold only for life in whatever way.

In the first situation, where the landholder has both the fee
and the free tenement, modern lawyers would say he has an
estate that is presently possessory—i.e., he is presently in
physical control—and also has the right to pass that estate
to his heirs. In the second situation, where he has the fee,
but not the free tenement, he has the right to pass his
interest in the land to his heirs, but he does not have a
presently possessory estate. Someone else has physical
control of the estate for life. In the third, where he has the
free tenement, but not the fee, he has present control of the
land, but not the right to pass it to his heirs. Thus, the free
tenement represents the presently possessory life estate,
and the fee represents the heritable interest.
173. The authors never say, however, that the fee is unlimited in time, as
modern property scholarship describes the fee simple.
174. 3 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 249. Again, it only applied to the nearest heir
if that heir was a child, brother, sister, nephew, or niece. Id.
175. Id. at 275. There are a few cues that point to authorship after 1236 for
this tractate. There is a limitation date that did not come into effect until 1237
and a reference to the writ of cosinage, which William of Ralegh invented in the
1230s. Id. at 249-50. This does not necessarily mean that Henry de Bratton
wrote the tractate; William of Ralegh spent some time in exile between 1243
and 1244, during a fight with the king over his election to an episcopal see, and
this might have been an opportunity for him to work on the treatise. See 4
MATTHEW PARIS, CHRONICA MAJORA 263-64, 285 (Henry Richards Luard ed.,
1872–1883). Generally speaking, though, the later a tractate was written, the
more likely it is that the treatise had already been handed over to Bratton.
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Ralegh is doing something rather extraordinary in the
causae scheme. Where the Glanvill treatise used writs to
create its organizational framework—sections of the
treatise tend to focus on the procedures surrounding a
particular writ—Ralegh is using words. Where the Glanvill
author would focus on the assize of novel disseisin and the
assize of mort d’ancestor, Ralegh is focusing his discussion
on the meanings of the words fee and free tenement. So, for
instance, where he could have said that the assize of novel
disseisin was available to a doweress or a widower holding
by curtsey, but not to a guardian or termor, Ralegh instead
gives us the phrase free tenement, which is contained in the
writ, and defines it as a life estate, which is what a
doweress or widower holding by curtsey would have.176 To
say that the free tenement is held for life is equivalent to
saying that the assize applies only to estates held for life or
longer. It is the fact that the author discusses these matters
using abstract concepts rather than concrete writs that is
really interesting. In place of a discussion about whether a
particular type of plaintiff might bring a particular writ, the
author presents us with a system of different causae of
possession, based on duration. He is thinking like the
authors of the Institutes, who place things prior to actions,
concepts prior to the procedures that put them into practice.
There is a real danger of oversystematizing the Bracton
authors’ writing on the causae possidendi. The authors are
inconsistent in the content of the list of causae itself,
sometimes leaving out terms and sometimes replacing them
with others. Many of the lists we find in the treatise leave
out the bare use.177 Once we see the usufruct and the bare
use replaced with seisin.178 In addition to the inconsistency
we see in the terms themselves, there is a great deal of
inconsistency in the ways the authors use them. The
usufruct seems to have caused them no end of trouble, for
instance, as they tried to make this Roman term fit their
experience from English practice.179 And the authors are
176. SUTHERLAND, supra note 39, at 13.
177. See, e.g., 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 127.
178. See id. at 123.
179. In parts of the treatise, the authors say that the usufruct is for life. See
id. at 101. This would, of course, gut the concept of the free tenement, making it
indistinguishable from a usufruct. The authors are inconsistent in their
treatment of the usufruct and the free tenement because Roman law conflicts
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with the writ system of the English courts. At Roman law a usufruct could be for
a term of years or for life. See Miller, supra note 88, at 66. English court practice
distinguished between the termor, who could not bring an assize of novel
disseisin, and a life tenant, who could.
A passage in the tractate on exceptions, near the end of the treatise, presents
the usufruct in a way that not only conflicts with Roman law, but also with the
view of the usufruct presented in the causae scheme. The usufruct at Roman
law was a right in rem that, as we have seen, included the rights to use the land
and its fruits. See BERGER, supra note 87, at 755; Miller, supra note 88, at 42,
65-66. It differed from full dominium, however, in that it was a personal
servitude; the grant was personal to the grantee and he had no right to transfer
(abusus) it to another during his life or at death. See Miller, supra note 88, at
66-67. The Bracton authors were aware of the Roman doctrine that the usufruct
was a servitude. They list it among servitudes in the beginning of the tractate
on things, which borrows heavily from Justinian’s Institutes. See 2 BRACTON,
supra note 5, at 39. In this passage in the tractate on exceptions, however, one
of the Bracton authors takes an approach to the usufruct that in some ways
accords with and in some ways conflicts with that of the Roman jurists. To this
author, the usufruct is a chattel, which leaves the “tenement…unchanged in
character as a lay fee.” 4 Id. at 268. The author was following the practice of the
English courts, which treated a term of years as a chattel. In thirteenth-century
England, the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over wills. This meant that
the Church had a great deal of power over how one’s possessions passed at
death. This power was not complete, however, because most land could not be
passed by will and remained within the jurisdiction of the royal courts. The
royal courts classed terms of years as chattels, subjecting them to the
jurisdiction of the Church courts. This solution to an English problem accords
with the Roman jurists’ conception of the usufruct in part. The Digest says that
the usufruct is “not a part of ownership” (non dominii pars), a phrase which the
Bracton authors actually quote in part of the treatise. This fits together well
with the idea that the usufruct is a chattel and does not change the nature of
the tenement. See 3 Id. at 162; DIG.50.16.25 (Paulus, Edict 21). But the author’s
purpose in calling the usufruct a chattel—allowing the holder of the usufruct to
pass it by will at death—runs precisely counter to the Roman conception of what
a usufruct is. The usufructuary at Roman law had no right to alienate the
usufruct, which was extinguished at his death and therefore could not pass by
will. See Miller, supra note 88, at 67.
In addition to conflicting with the Roman law of the usufruct, this passage
conflicts with the causae of possession scheme. How could the usufruct be a
chattel and a causa at the same time? The authors treat the causae as if they
are reasons for possessing a thing, not things in and of themselves. This is a
clear case where the authors’ attempt to systematize the practice of the English
courts into an internally consistent law using Roman law as their model falls
down. In order to make the usufruct accord with court practice, the authors
needed to live with a certain degree of dissonance. The treatise was probably
never fully edited by the original authors, though, and it is possible that they
never noticed the dissonance.
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least consistent when they discuss the right and the
property. Where the terms usufruct, free tenement, and fee
are fairly stable, appearing in most of the versions of the list
we find in the treatise, the terms at the top of the list
change regularly. In one version of the list, they become the
“pure right and the proprietas.”180 In another, they are
called the “dominium and proprietas,” two Roman law
terms that were synonyms, not separate interests, in
mainstream interpretations of Roman law.181 Even stranger
is the fact that dominium plays a different role immediately
before this passage. On what would be the same folio in
most manuscripts, the author, probably Ralegh here, tells
us that the dominium of an estate is composed of “the pure
right and the property, the fee and the free tenement and
the usufruct.”182 In this list, property is a part of dominium.
In the other, they are separate causae. In Roman law, they
were synonyms.183
Why did these higher interests cause so much trouble?
The authors of the treatise seem to have been unsure what
was left over when the term of years (usufruct), the life
estate (free tenement), and the heritability (fee) were taken
out and granted to another person. What can be longer than
a heritable estate that lasts forever? Perhaps the lord’s
right to take the estate by escheat when the landholder’s
heirs run out. This should just be another fee, however,
according to the authors’ classification. The authors define
the causae in terms of time rather than enjoyment of the
land. So when the fee and the free tenement are separated,
as when a widow holds the land in dower for life, as a free
180. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 127 (my translation) (“merum ius et
proprietatem”).
181. Id. at 128.
182. Id. at 127 (I have modified Thorne’s translation) (“merum ius et
proprietatem, feodum et liberum tenementum, et usumfructum”).
183. Dominium could mean two things to an English justice with Roman law
training. On the one hand, it could be a synonym for proprietas. On the other
hand, it was the Latin translation for demesne, the land which the person at
issue held and worked personally (or by unfree tenants, who did not count in the
eyes of the law), rather than holding through a free tenant. Perhaps it means
demesne here, since one who had held by all of these causae would, by definition,
be working the land himself. One could hold in demesne without having the fee,
the property, or the right, however. A woman holding in dower would hold only
a free tenement, but could be said to hold in demesne.
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tenement, and the previous holder’s heir holds the heritable
estate, as a fee, the fee is not a possessory estate, but
merely what modern property law would call a reversion.
How do we differentiate the causae greater than the fee: the
right, property, pure right, or dominium? The authors do
not provide us with an answer.
B. The Two Rights
Where the Glanvill author had treated right and
property as synonyms, the authors of the causae of
possession scheme in Bracton imagined them to be separate,
if ill-defined, causae. Other parts of the treatise present us
with a view of the relationship between right, property, and
possession that contradicts both of these views, however.
Near the beginning of the treatise, an author, probably
Ralegh, presents us with two kinds of right:
For there is a right of possession (ius possessionis) and a right
of property (ius proprietatis): the right of possession, as of fee,
where the assise of mort d’ancestor is applicable; and as of free
tenement, as where one holds only for life, no matter in what
way. The right of property is termed the pure right. Thus one
may well have both. The right of property may sometimes be
separated from the right of possession, for immediately after
the death of his ancestor the property descends to the nearer
heir, whether he is a minor or of full age, a male or a female, a
madman or a fool, as an idiot, one who is deaf and dumb,
present or absent, ignorant of the matter or apprised of it.
Possession, however, is not at once acquired by such persons,
though possession and the right of possession ought always to
184
follow the property.

184. Id. at 24 (I have modified Thorne’s translation) (“Quia est ius proprietatis
et ius possessionis. Item ius possessionis sicut feodum, et unde locum habet
assisa mortis antecessoris. Item ius possessionis sicut liberum tenementum, si
quis tenuerit tantum ad vitam quacumque ratione. Item ius proprietatis quod
dicitur ius merum. Et unde poterit quis habere utrumque. Et dividi poterit
quandoque ius proprietatis a iure possessionis. Quia proprietas statim post
mortem antecessoris descendit heredi propinquiori, minori et maiori, masculo et
feminæ, furioso et stulto sicut fatuo, surdo et muto, præsenti et absenti, et
ignoranti sicut scienti. Sed tamen non statim adquiritur talibus possessio, licet
possessio et ius possessionis semper sequi debeat proprietatem.”). Thorne calls
these two rights possessory right and proprietary right, but in the Latin,
possessionis and proprietatis are genitive nouns, not adjectives. This passage is
found in a section of the treatise most likely written by Ralegh. It appears in an
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In this passage, Ralegh bifurcates the concept of right
into a right of possession and a right of property. In doing
so, he follows the earlier treatises to an extent. Like
Glanvill, he uses the binary of pleas of possession and pleas
of property, and places the assizes of novel disseisin and
mort d’ancestor on the side of possession. Unlike Glanvill,
he does not equate possession with seisin and property with
right. In this scheme, both writs of possession and writs of
property implicate right.185 Ralegh may not follow Glanvill,
but he follows the Roman law of possession and property
very closely. The right of property descends automatically to
the heir at death because taking property requires no act or
intention. The right of possession, however, does not pass
automatically because, at Roman law, one had to take
possession both corpore and animo, by body and by mind.
Ralegh lists several classes of people who would be unable
to take possession animo because they lacked the mental
capacity to do so. Ralegh is making another valiant effort to
work the writs he administered in the courts into the frame
of Roman property law.
This scheme of the two rights conflicts with the causae
scheme in some significant respects, however. If we look at
the list that gives the causae as “the right and the property,
addicio, one of the later additions to the text, which could indicate that Bratton,
not Ralegh, wrote it. Even if these words were written by Bratton, however, the
idea of separating right into a right of possession and a right of property must
have come from Ralegh originally, since it appears throughout the treatise, and
in parts that Ralegh is almost certain to have written. A notable example occurs
in the tractate on acquiring dominion over things, very close to two passages
that are updated to reflect the statute of Merton of 1236, indicating that the
primary text was written before that date. See id. at 189.
185. It is, of course, possible that Ralegh is using the word right (ius) in a
different sense here than the the Glanvill author does. Ius was a word that
could have many meanings. The Glanvill author imported the term from the
grand assize, which asked who had the “greater right” (maius ius). Glanvill used
the word to mean that which is decided by the writ of right, a concept which
could also be expressed by the word rectum. But ius was also used in a general
way in Roman law texts to mean any right. In the causae of possession scheme
and in the “quantum of right” scheme, which we will examine next, Bratton and
Ralegh appear to use the word ius in the same way the writ of right and the
Glanvill author used it. Shortly after the section quoted above, Ralegh tells us
that when the right of property is split, one person will have the “greater right”
(maius ius), language drawn directly from the grand assize, indicating that he
was thinking about the grand assize when he wrote the text that contains the
two rights scheme. See id. at 25.
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the fee and the free tenement, the usufruct and the bare
use” we can see that it does not sit neatly with a bifurcated
scheme that separates right into a right of possession and a
right of property.186 In the causae, right and property are
often listed as two separate causae, two separate reasons for
possessing the land. Possession is what the landholder has,
and right or property is his reason for having it, a reason
which also determines the temporal scope of the
landholding (whether it is hereditary, for life, for a term,
etc.). In the causae scheme, right and property are
comparable terms, both causae. Possession is not a causa
and is not comparable to these two other terms. In the
scheme of the two rights, it is possession and property that
are the comparable terms. They are two attributes a right
may have. So the words right, possession, and property play
very different roles in these two schemes.
The Causae of Possession

The Two Rights
Writ
Right

RIGHT

of
PROPERTY

PROPERTY
Fee/
Mort d’an.

Fee

RIGHT

POSSESSION
Free Tenement
Usufruct

POSSESSION
Free ten/
Nov. dis.

Bare Use

The two schemes also differ greatly in their treatment
of the substantive law of possession. In the causae
possidendi, possession is a fact. The list of causae is a list of
underlying interests that make that possession legitimate.
They are abstract rights in the land that allow that land to
be possessed in a certain way. In the bifurcated right
scheme, the word possession is doing very different work. I
discussed earlier possession’s tendency to become an
186. Id. at 101.
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abstract right.187 That is what has happened here. It has
become a right of possession, a lesser right than the right of
property. Gone is the Digest’s insistence, repeated elsewhere
in the Bracton treatise, that possession and property have
nothing in common.188 Here they exist on the same
continuum.
C. A Quantum of Right
In the two-rights scheme, Ralegh associated the writ of
right, the assize of mort d’ancestor, and the assize of novel
disseisin with the concept of right, despite the fact that
Glanvill associated only the writ of right with right and
associated the two lower writs, mort d’ancestor and novel
disseisin, with seisin.189 The idea that right exists even in
some of the writs at the lower end of the scale is central to
the third scheme we will examine, the “quantum of right”
scheme. In the tractate on acquiring dominion over things,
very close to several of the accounts of the causae possidendi
we have already seen, one of the authors, probably Ralegh
again, presents us with the following scheme:
[1] There is possession which has nothing of right but
something of possession, as where one is in possession by
intrusion. [2] There is another kind that has something of
possession but nothing of right, as where one is in possession
as guardian or creditor and the like. [3] There is another that
has much of possession [but] little of right, as the possession of
an ancestor, [recovered] in a possessory action, where another
has the pure right and the ancestor the fee and free tenement.
[4] And another that has a great deal of possession and
something of right, where it is changed into a proprietary
causa, as where one holds for a term of life or years. [5] There
is also possession that has much of possession and much of
right, as where in some thing one has the pure right and the
190
property, the fee and the free tenement with seisin.

187. See supra Part I.C.
188. See, e.g., 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 321; 3 id. at 325.
189. See supra Part II.
190. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 122-23. I have modified the translation
slightly from Thorne’s. For situation 3, Thorne has a “good deal of
possession” but the Latin is “multum . . . possessionis,” the same phrase he
translates as “much of possession” for situation 5. There is a second version
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Ralegh places various types of land arrangements on a
continuum based on how much possession and how much
right each one contains. Right increases fairly steadily from
1 to 5. Possession generally increases as right increases, but
this is not universally so. Situations 1 and 2 have something
of possession, 3 has much of possession, 4 has a great deal of
possession, and 5 reverts to much of possession. So,
possession and right appear to be independent of each
other.
In one way, this list fits with the causae of possession
very well. Apart from number 5, these are marginal cases,
where the holder of the land holds by one causa, but not by
another. In number 3, for instance, Ralegh has imagined a
case where the possessor holds by fee, but not by right.
Ralegh is thus finding ways to separate and distinguish
categories of landholding. In other ways, however, the
quantum of right conflicts directly with the causae and the
two-rights schemes. In the causae of possession, right and
property were comparable terms, of the same order. In the
two-rights scheme, possession and property were
comparable. In the quantum of right scheme, possession
and right are the comparable terms. The author is taking
the Roman binary between possession and property, which
the author of Glanvill applied to the Anglo-French terms
seisin and right, and hybridizing it into a binary between
possession and right. This was not altogether new. The
author of the Très Ancien Coutumier de Normandie, written
in parts over the course of the thirteenth century, had used
the same distinction, as had William of Ralegh in a 1231
case recorded on his roll.191 David Seipp has shown that the
possession-right dichotomy was also used in the law reports
of the late thirteenth century to describe writs.192
of the quantum of right scheme in the treatise, in the introduction to the
section of the treatise on civil actions. This version has six tiers. 3 Id. at 13.
191. See 1 COUTUMIERS DE NORMANDIE 23, 279-80 (Ernest-Joseph Tardif ed.,
1881–1896); 2 BRACTON’S NOTE BOOK 437 (F.W. Maitland ed., 1887) (“[T]o be
lord and heir pertains to right and not to possession . . . .”) (my translation)
(“[E]sse dominum et heredem spectat ad ius et non ad possessionem . . . .”).
192. Seipp has shown that in the year books, the possession-right dichotomy
was used in two, inconsistent, ways. See Seipp, supra note 131, at 9-26. First, it
was used to create two, entirely separate categories of writs. Id. All writs of
possession had something in common with each other, and all writs of right had
something in common with each other, but never the twain shall meet. Id. at 22.
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The author’s patterns of thought about this binary are
primarily Anglo-French. Possession and property, in
conventional interpretations of Roman law circulating in
Northern Europe, did not come in amounts. One could not
have greater property than another.193 One could have
greater right, however: the jurors in a grand assize were
asked precisely who has the “greater right” in a piece of
land.194 Although it would describe Roman law actions
poorly, the quantum of right scheme actually describes
English writs rather well because it does not require a
binary classification. A writ like mort d’ancestor, which is
higher in the hierarchy of writs than the novel disseisin, but
lower than the writ of right, can be both a writ of possession
and a writ of right. Situation three describes an assize of
mort d’ancestor, or another writ of the mort d’ancestor
family, which has “much of possession” and also a “little of
right.”195 So the assize of mort d’ancestor is primarily
possessory, but also has some of the aspects of an action on
right or property.
The quantum of right scheme causes at least as many
problems as it solves, however. Situation 4, where the
possessory causa turns into a proprietary one, shows some
Second, it was used to describe writs in a relational way. Id. at 25. By Glanvill’s
time, the courts had established a rule that there was a hierarchy of writs and,
if one sued on a higher writ, he was barred from bring the same case on any writ
beneath it in the hierarchy. Id. One could, however, bring his suit on a lower
writ, lose, and bring the case again on a higher writ. Id. When faced with issues
of whether the plaintiff was precluded from bringing his case, the lawyers of the
late thirteenth century would use the possession-right binary, but in a relative
way. Id. Thus, the lower writ was always denominated a writ of possession and
the higher a writ of right. Id. Thus, when a person had sued on a writ of entry
and later sued on a writ of right, the writ of right would be unsurprisingly,
denominated a writ on the right and the writ of entry a writ on the possession,
because it is lower. Id. at 25-26. But if the plaintiff had sued on a writ of mort
d’ancestor and later wanted to sue on a writ of entry, the writ of entry would be
denominated a writ on the right, because, of the two writs, it is the higher in the
hierarchy. Id. Whether a writ was on the possession or the right was thus
situational, based on the writ it was being compared to. Id. at 26.
193. Miller, supra note 88, at 45 (“[O]wnership is a distinct paramount right
rather than a mere label attaching to the most compelling of two or more
competing claims to a thing.”).
194. See EARLY REGISTERS, supra note 38, at 6.
195. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 122 (I have modified Thorne’s
translation) (“Est et alia quæ multum habet possessionis et parum iuris . . . .”).
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of the contradictions inherent in Ralegh’s thinking.196
Ralegh is thinking about possession in two different ways:
he uses the possession/right distinction of the quantum of
right scheme, but also the possession/property distinction of
the two rights scheme. So, in this situation, the plaintiff’s
causa, here probably meaning a cause of action, “is changed
to a proprietary causa.”197 This appears to be the two-rights
scheme. The plaintiff’s cause of action, or his writ, has
crossed the line from a possessory writ to a proprietary writ.
He clearly thinks that one may have more or less of
possession and right when thinking in terms of the
quantum of right scheme, since he says this person has a
great deal of possession and something of right. In the tworights scheme, there are no amounts of possession and
property. An action is either possessory or proprietary. And
yet an action that has crossed the line from possession to
property still has “a great deal of possession” and, strangely,
only “something of right.”198
Indeed, in this passage, Ralegh combines all three of the
schemes. In situation 5, which is greatest of the five in right
and property, he combines the quantum of right scheme
with the causae possidendi scheme.199 A person in this
situation holds the land under all of the causae possidendi
except, perhaps, the usufruct and bare use: “the [pure] right
and the property, the fee and the free tenement with
seisin.”200 This sounds like absolute ownership, since the
person has pure right and property in the land, but even
this is only said to have “much of” right and “much of”
possession.201 The author, in combining these schemes, uses
the word right in two different ways. It is part of his hybrid
binary of possession and right, but it is also a causa
possidendi. One who has the purest right one can have has
“much right” in the land. In the causae possidendi scheme,
right is something one has or does not and, in this case,
represents the highest and purest type of interest one can
have in land. In the two-rights scheme, right is bifurcated,
196. Id. at 123.
197. Id. (I have modified Thorne’s translation) (“vertitur causa proprietatis”).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 122-23.
200. Id.
201. Id.

1188

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60

but it is still something one has or does not. In the quantum
of right scheme, it is something one can have more or less
of.
IV. UNTANGLING THE THREE LANGUAGES
A. An Absolute Right?
The problem the authors had in all three schemes with
right, pure right, property, and dominium stems from a
fundamental difference between English and Roman ways
of thinking about the relationship between people and land.
The authors clearly knew that Roman property was an
absolute concept, an in rem right good against the world. In
theory, they could imagine something like that. There was
an absolute right to land that only God could judge. They
use terms in the treatise that suggest that they wanted
their law to have such a pure and absolute right to land.
The language of pure right and the idea that all of the
causae together add up to dominium both suggest an
absolute right, as does the concept of the “true owner” or
“true lord” (verus dominus), which appears in practically
every tractate of the treatise.202 We even see a double right,
when the right of possession and the right of property are
combined, which the authors call dreit dreit (literally, “right
right”), which appears to be a Bractonian invention, absent
from the English court lexicon before the treatise.203
Even if they could imagine a pure, absolute right in rem
in their vernacular discussions of right and in the Roman
law of property, the theory that no human could judge this
absolute right admitted no such possibility. In human
courts, all rights were relative. The grand assize could only
ever decide who had the “greater right.” Thus, we end up
with a confused set of schemes that try to speak to both
right’s relative nature and property’s absolute and final
nature.204 They all seem to contain some sort of vague notion
that property and right are equivalent. The result is that
202. See id. at 84, 86, 123, 127, 155, 157, 174, 230, 240-41; 3 id. at 23, 24, 27,
33, 51, 70, 84, 89, 91, 97, 128, 133-36.
203. 3 Id. at 325.
204. As Seipp observed, the two rights theory used “a Roman vocabulary to
approximate an English notion of ‘relative’ ownership.” Seipp, supra note 131, at
13.
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each takes on the attributes of the other. Property becomes
relative and right becomes absolute. Immediately following
the discussion of the two rights scheme we have examined,
for instance, Ralegh tells us that “[t]he right of property can
sometimes be separated from the right of possession.”205
This leads Ralegh to give an example where the two rights
are held by different people and actually descend to
different people. A father dies leaving two sons.206 The
younger son puts himself in seisin upon his father’s death,
in violation of his elder brother’s right, and then dies seised
of the land.207 Upon his death, the possessory right will
actually descend to the son of this younger son, as his
nearest heir.208 Oddly enough, according to Ralegh, the
younger son’s son also inherits “a certain right of property
which should follow the principal property.”209
Two people have the same right of property in the same
land. This was impossible in Roman law.210 How could
Ralegh resolve this? Echoing the words of the writ of right,
Ralegh answers this question for the case of the two
brothers: “The heirs of the first brother have a greater right
than those of the second.”211 One right of property is a better
right of property than the other. It would seem that Henry
de Bratton seconded this relative view of right and
property.212 Just as Ralegh imagines the two-rights scheme
205. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 24 (I have modified Thorne’s translation) (“Et
dividi poterit quandoque ius proprietatis a iure possessionis.”).
206. Id. at 24-25.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 25 (I have modified Thorne’s translation) (“quoddam ius
proprietatis . . . quod sequi deberet primam proprietatem”).
210. See DIG. 13.6.5.15 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 28) (stating that two people
cannot have dominium in the same thing in solidum); Thomas Rüfner, The
Roman Concept of Ownership and the Medieval Concept of Dominium Utile, in
THE CREATION OF THE IUS COMMUNE: FROM CASUS TO REGULA 131, 136 (John W.
Cairns & Paul J. Du Plessis eds., 2010) (demonstrating that the rule against
multiple ownership was adopted from Roman law into medieval canon law and
caused some difficulty for medieval jurists trying to explain how it could fit with
notions of lordship).
211. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 25.
212. The following discussion appears in the introduction to the section on civil
actions. 3 Id. at 13. I suspect Bratton wrote this introduction rather than Ralegh
because it contains a reference to William of Drogheda’s Summa Aurea, which
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as relative, Bratton imagines the quantum of possession
scheme as relative. He runs through a list of six different
types of interests one may have, according to the amount of
possession and the amount of right that each one contains,
and then tells us, “But though he has a maximum of
possession and of right, nevertheless another may have a
greater right in the same thing.”213 Finally, Ralegh imagines
the causae possidendi scheme, the most absolute of all the
schemes, as relative. According to a passage in the tractate
on acquiring dominion, “[o]ne may have the [pure] right and
the property, the fee and the free tenement [acquired]
through some justa causa of acquisition and rightful title,
and another have all these and the greater right, because of
priority in time.”214 Once again, the writ of right’s “greater
right” makes it impossible for anyone to have a right that is
good against all comers. In none of the three schemes is
there a point where someone has an absolute right good
against the world.
Roman law could simply not be made to fit with the
language the authors found in their writs. Roman law had
actions on the possession and actions on the property. It had
an in rem property right, which decided ownership against
all the world. The writ of right only decided who, among two
people, had the greater right. Writs, documents that set
procedures into motion, could not be easily reduced to the
abstract concepts that characterized Roman law. The
processes of the royal courts, defined by writs, were thus not
susceptible to an easy systematization on the Roman model.
B. Time
The idea of relativity of right came to the authors both
from the vernacular and from the writs that followed the
was probably not in circulation until 1239. See Richardson, supra note 71, at 2326. This does not mean that this passage was not written by Ralegh, who might
have still been working on the treatise in the 1240s, but it makes it more likely
that the treatise had passed into Bratton’s hands by the time this passage was
written.
213. 3 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 13.
214. 2 Id. at 103 (I have modified Thorne’s translation) (“Item poterit quis
habere ius merum et proprietatem, feodum et liberum tenementum, ex aliqua
iusta causa adquisitionis et ex iusto titulo, et alius haec omnia, sed maius ius
propter temporis prioritatem.”).
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vernacular understanding of right. The second un-Roman
aspect that we see in the treatise appears to have come from
outside of the writ system altogether and thus to represent
one way that the authors’ vernacular understandings of
landholding influenced the ways they thought about writs
and Roman law. The authors of Bracton were obsessed with
time. They took easily to the Roman law of prescription and
usucapion and molded it to fit their own sense that right
became stronger with time.
Maitland famously said in his chapter on ownership and
possession in The History of English Law Before the Time of
Edward I that the “most salient trait of our English land
law” is that “[p]roprietary rights in land are . . . projected
upon the plane of time. The category of quantity, of
duration, is applied to them.”215 Maitland’s pithy
formulation of the estates in land has become a staple of the
American first-year property curriculum.216 Maitland’s
heavy reliance on Bracton for the legal doctrine of the
thirteenth century is well known. Indeed, it might be more
accurate to call the book The History of English Law Before
the Time of Edward I According to Bracton. Even though he
recognizes that there was, as yet, no doctrine of estates in
land, he treats Bracton’s obsession with time and duration
as a sort of system of estates in the making, and also
assumes that Bracton is representative of thirteenthcentury law.217
The Bracton authors’ obsession with time should have
raised red flags for Maitland, however. Bracton’s
discussions of time diverge from and go far beyond those
found in Roman law, to the extent that it seems unlikely
that Roman influence was the driving force behind them.
They also fit very poorly with the dominant historical model
of English landholding at Maitland’s time: feudalism. The
history of landholding before the introduction of Henry II’s
procedural reforms has largely been written as a story of
feudal relations. Under the feudal model, lordship is
considered to be the nexus between people and land and
landholding is defined by the relationship between lord and
vassal. The lord was the true landowner and bought service
215. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 107, at 10.
216. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 192 (7th ed. 2010).
217. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 107, at 10-12.
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with that land through the ceremonies of homage and
fealty, after which the vassal became the lord’s man
(homme, hence homage), received land, and, in exchange,
owed the lord service, often as a knight. The relationship
through which people acquired access to land was thus a
personal bond between two people and, according to this
model, the vassal’s access to land lasted exactly as long as
that personal bond. Most scholars have seen the vassal in
the pre-legalized, feudal world as, at most, a holder for
life.218 He might expect that his eldest son would succeed to
his lands at his death, but his son had nothing like a legally
enforceable inheritance right. In fact, S.F.C. Milsom has
argued that the vassal had no right in the land at all, only
an affective relationship with his lord, one result of which
was temporary access to a piece of land.219
Since the 1970s, many scholars have broken away from
this feudal model of landholding.220 Susan Reynolds and
John Hudson have argued persuasively that a person’s right
to hold his land in the early middle ages had very little to do
with his lord.221 Hudson analyzes charters recording land
transfers by vassals. He concludes that, in cases of
perpetual transfers by subinfeudation, even when the lord’s
permission was sought and included in the charter, there is
no evidence that “the lord was seen at the time as the real
or even the co-donor.”222 The vassal did not imagine himself
as having a life estate or a mere affective relationship with
his lord. He imagined that his land belonged to his family in
perpetuity and could be alienated without the lord’s
permission, subject to “a norm, the strength of which varied

218. See, e.g., S.F.C. MILSOM, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM
120-21 (1976); Samuel E. Thorne, English Feudalism and Estates in Land, 17
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 193, 205, 208-29 (1959).
219. See MILSOM, supra note 218, at 120-21.
220. See, e.g., HUDSON, supra note 26 at 205-07; REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at
388; STEPHEN D. WHITE, CUSTOM, KINSHIP, AND GIFTS TO SAINTS: THE LAUDATIO
PARENTUM IN WESTERN FRANCE, 1050-1150, at 1-7 (1988); Elizabeth A.R. Brown,
The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe, 79
AM. HIST. REV. 1063, 1063-67 (1974); Paul Hyams, Homage and Feudalism: A
Judicious Separation, in DIE GEGENWART DES FEUDALISMUS 14, 14-48 (Natalie
Fryde et al. eds., 2002).
221. HUDSON, supra note 26, at 205-07; REYNOLDS, supra note 21, at 388.
222. HUDSON, supra note 26, at 213.
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with circumstances,” that the lord should be consulted.223
The most important of those circumstances was the length
of time the vassal’s family had been seised of the land.
Vassals felt freer to alienate, without the lord’s permission,
land they had inherited than land that had come as a direct
grant from that lord.224 Bracton bears this out. While the
treatise does mention lordship in other contexts, it plays
almost no role at all in the treatise’s discussions of one’s
right to hold land.225 The language of lordship does not
impinge on the discussions of Roman property law or force
the authors to twist Roman law to accord with it.
Bracton suggests, as Hudson’s charters do, that the
actual nexus between people and land was not lordship, but
time. Time was what allowed a person, or more often a
lineage, to place its stamp of right upon the land. According
to one author, “[s]ome possessions are short and tenuous,
others long and fortified by time.”226 Roman law did have a
doctrine, or several doctrines, of time. Under the law of
prescription and usucapion, a person who had no property
right in a thing could establish one through long possession.
This is another area where the authors of the treatise
twisted the Roman law they found in their sources to suit
their needs. The authors of the treatise, both Ralegh and
Bracton, quote the sections of Azo’s Summa Codicis that
discuss usucapion and prescription, so we know that they
drew some of their Roman doctrine from that source.227 But
where Azo discusses usucapion, prescription after ten to
twenty years, and prescription after thirty to forty years as
three different categories of prescription, all of which
require different legal analyses, the Bracton authors elide
the three and use prescription, usucapion, and possession
223. Id. at 215.
224. Vassals were more likely to record their heirs’ permission in charters
alienating inherited land and their lord’s permission in charters alienating land
acquired by direct grant from the lord. See id. at 209.
225. When the Bracton authors discuss the dominus, they almost always use
the word in the Roman sense of owner rather than the medieval sense of lord.
See, e.g., 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 174 (using the phrase dominus verus to
mean the true owner, who has the capacity to make a gift).
226. Id. at 123 (“Item possessionum quaedam brevis et tenera, et quaedam
longa et tempore firmata.”).
227. See id. at 121.
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for a long time as synonyms.228 The authors’ emphasis on
the Roman law of prescription and usucapion goes far
beyond the treatment it receives in the authors’ Roman law
sources.229 It permeates every tractate. The authors of
Bracton speak of acquiring right, property, or a free
tenement through “long and peaceful possession” or “long
and peaceful seisin,” phrases undoubtedly modified from
Justinian’s “long and unchallenged possession,” no less than
fourteen times in the treatise.230 As time passes, the fact
that someone is holding land matures and strengthens into
a right to hold that land; an “is” becomes an “ought.” “Long
and peaceful” landholding will mature into a right to
remain on the land, no matter how it was acquired.231
The issues of relativity that we saw in the causae
possidendi scheme also implicate time. Even the highest of
the causae, those ones that the Bracton authors try to
imagine as absolute in the Roman sense, are subject to the
rule of priority in time. As we saw in one list of the causae,
“One may have the [pure] right and the property, the fee
and the free tenement [acquired] through some justa causa
of acquisition and rightful title, and another have all these
and the greater right, because of priority in time.”232 The one
who is prior in time, who has held longest or whose family
has held longest, wins.
Time is also the way the authors divide the various
interests people may have in the same land. The causae
possidendi describe not different ways of cutting up the use
rights to a piece of land, but different ways of dividing it
temporally: the usufruct is for a term, the free tenement is
for life, and the fee continues beyond the life of the current
holder. The authors have to twist Roman law here. The
usufruct was not defined in terms of time in Roman law. It
228. AZO, supra note 12, at 731-51; 2 BRACTON, supra note 5 at 126, 156.
229. See AZO, supra note 12, at 731-39; J. INST. 2.6; TEACHING
supra note 12, at 37 .

OF

ROMAN LAW,

230. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 102, 123, 126, 127, 142, 150; 3 id. at 247, 248,
320; J. INST. 2.6.7.
231. 2 BRACTON, supra note 5 at 123, 126, 127, 142, 150; 3 id. at 247, 248, 320.
232. 2 id. at 103 (second alteration in original) (I have substituted “pure right”
for Thorne’s “mere right”) (“Item poterit quis habere ius merum et proprietatem,
feodum et liberum tenementum, ex aliqua iusta causa adquisitionis et ex iusto
titulo, et alius haex omnia, sed maius ius propter temporis prioritatem.”).
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was defined principally as the combination of two use
rights, the right to use the thing and the right to enjoy its
fruits.233 At Roman law, its duration was a matter for its
creator. He could create a usufruct to last either for a term
or for the usufructuary’s life.234 For Bracton, the fact that it
is for life is what defines the usufruct; use rights are not a
natural way to divide up the land for the authors. The
highest of the causae, the right, property, pure right, or
dominium depending on the list, are, oddly enough, the
most attenuated from any right to actually use the land. If
each of the causae in a piece of land is really possessed by a
different person, it is the lowest on the list who has present
control and the right to use it, the people above him having
what we would think of as future interests that take effect
when his causa ends. The person with the highest interests,
the interests called “pure” and “proprietary,” have some sort
of interest that is beyond the fee, beyond the right to
inherit. These causae, which the author speaks of in the
most absolute terms available to him, are defined as
possessions fortified by the greatest amount of time and
continuing for the greatest time in the future. They entail
no present use rights, however.
This focus on time could potentially be explained by the
writs that the Bracton authors, themselves judges, worked
with in the royal courts. Writs contained limitation dates
that precluded litigants from bringing cases that were too
old. A writ of novel disseisin began, “[t]he king to the
sheriff, greeting. A. de N. has complained to us that B.,
unjustly and without judgment, has disseised him of his
free tenement in N. after our last crossing from Ireland to
England.”235 The king changed the limitation dates from
time to time. The return of King John from Ireland to which
the writ refers took place in 1210, and this limitation date
came into force in 1218, meaning that, at the time,
disseisins committed eight years ago or longer were no
longer actionable by an assize of novel disseisin.236 A justice
could think of this in terms of A’s free tenement being
extinguished and B’s very weak claim maturing into a free
233. Miller, supra note 88, at 64-65.
234. Id. at 66-67.
235. EARLY REGISTERS, supra note 38, at 1.
236. Id. at xxxv-xxxvi.
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tenement, although A still had the right in the land and
could bring a writ of right. One contemporary Norman
author did in fact read limitation dates this way.237 The fact
that the limitation periods were longer for the assize of mort
d’ancestor and even longer for the writ of right could lead
one to the conclusion that those interests, the fee and the
right, required more time to mature.238 But this reading of
the limitation dates, where A’s right is extinguished and B’s
matures, is not the Bracton authors’ reading. The authors of
Bracton never present limitation dates as if they extinguish
A’s right. One author, possibly Bratton, tells us that the
writ of right “is limited in time” and “does not go back of the
time of King Henry the grandfather of the lord king [i.e.,
before 1154],” but this most emphatically does not mean
that a person who lost his land before 1154 has no right:239
The reason is because beyond that time one cannot prove
anything, though he has a right in the thing, since no one can
prove anything back of that time, since he cannot speak of his
own sight, or of the sight of a father who enjoined his son to be
a witness if he should hear it disputed. Hence if one should
speak of the time of King Henry the elder he could lose because
240
of lack of proof.

237. The author of the Norman text called the Summa de Legibus in Curia
Laicali, which was written sometime in the middle of the thirteenth century,
argues that the limitation date on the writ of right was meant to approximate
the Roman prescriptive period of thirty years and that the date had been moved
by Philip Augustus from the coronation of Henry I to the coronation of Richard I
to better approximate the thirty-year period. Never mind that the limitation
date was never moved again, and that, at the time of writing, as many as
seventy years had passed since Richard I’s coronation. 2 COUTUMIERS DE
NORMANDIE, supra note 191, at 279-80.
238. EARLY REGISTERS, supra note 38, at xxxvi.
239. 4 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 170. This tractate, the tractate on defaults,
contains a reference to “Ralph, bishop of Chichester and then chancellor.” Ralph
Neville, bishop of Chichester, was chancellor until 1238 and then again from
1242–1244. For this passage to have been written at a time when Neville had
been, but was no longer, chancellor, it must have been written either between
1238 and 1242 or after 1244. Id. at 161. In either case, it was written in one of
the later stages of work on the treatise, increasing the odds that it was written
by Bratton. It also contains references to William of Drogheda’s Summa Aurea,
which was probably only available after 1239. Id. at 159; Richardson, supra note
71, at 23-26.
240. 4 BRACTON, supra note 5, at 170-71 (emphasis added).
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Right is never extinguished. One may lose the means to
recover it because he cannot prove his right to the
satisfaction of the court, but the person whose family was
ejected from the land before the limitation date still has the
greater right than the person whose family ejected him.
Likewise, while B can no longer be sued by A by a writ of
right once the limitation date has changed, he does not
actually acquire anything new. If C, who had no claim to the
land against A or B, had ejected B at any point while B held
the land, B could have sued him on a writ of right and won
because B still had the greater right. B had a right that was
protected by the writ of right the moment he ejected A from
the land.
The fact that the Bracton authors read time into so
many aspects of landholding in so many different ways
leads me to believe that they were not extrapolating the
element of time from the writs, but were rather reading the
writs through the lens of a landholding culture that already
saw time as the most important element in establishing
right. We can see this in one passage on the writ of right,
which comes immediately before the discussion of limitation
dates above; the writ itself does not implicate time, but
Bratton reads it as if it does. To Bratton, the reason why the
plaintiff in a writ of right must produce a witness who can
testify that the plaintiff’s ancestor took esplees from the
land—essentially meaning that he took some part of its
produce—is that it shows that the ancestor was on the land
for at least the minimal amount of time needed to take the
esplees, and therefore had more than a momentary seisin.241
It is highly unlikely that this was the actual reason for the
rule that esplees must be mentioned in a writ of right.
Rather, taking esplees is a way of making one’s claim to the
land visible. It shows that the claimant’s ancestor was on
the land as the landholder and not merely as a visitor or
intruder.242 But the author of this passage reads it as a
requirement about time.
Thus, there is no sense in the treatise that limitation
dates were the impetus for the authors to think about right
becoming stronger over time. Nor could the Roman law of
prescription be the impetus, because the authors had no
241. Id. at 170.
242. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 107, at 34.
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sense that titles could be extinguished as the Roman jurists
did. This, rather, seems to be the authors’ own background
coming into their writing. They are reading their texts in
light of an Anglo-French land culture that focused on time.
CONCLUSION
Property talk is so ingrained in both legal and lay
discourse that it is easy to imagine that property is a
neutral language that can be used to describe any
relationship between people and things. The fact that
property and possession are common to both common law
and civil law probably does not hurt this assessment. We
have seen, however, that the Bracton authors, part of the
first generation of English justices to learn to speak the
language of property, had a very difficult time conforming it
to their own languages of the relationship between people
and land. They had to twist contemporary understandings
of Roman law in the attempt to reconcile it to the practices
of the English courts and the understandings of the
Francophone Anglo-Norman landed elite, which existed
alongside each other as related and competing notions of the
way people related to land. The result was not pretty.
Bracton’s discussion of property law is muddled and
contradictory. It is the first time, however, that someone
thought to try to work the procedures associated with royal
writs into a system of property law.
The medieval English experience of trying to fit a nonproperty system of landholding into the mold of property
has the potential to open up further lines of inquiry in
property theory, lines of inquiry that I will follow in further
research. After all, if the English, the progenitors of the
common law, had so much trouble translating their
landholding practices into the discourse of property, how
useful is property talk for describing relations between
people and things in non-Western cultures? Of course,
words like property and possession mean something
different to modern legal scholars than they did to Roman
law-trained justices in the thirteenth century. To American
lawyers, property does not imply an absolute right good
against the world. To a lawyer trained in an American law
school, property implies concepts like subjective rights and
relative title and brings to mind metaphors like the famous
bundle of sticks. But this modern conception of property is
no more neutral than the Roman conception. In comparative
law literature, we often assume that we can describe the
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relations between people and things using the terms that
are familiar to us from first-year property. We assure
ourselves that, even if the locals would not talk about it
quite in that way, their relation to the land can be imagined
in terms of rights to exclude and rights to alienate. We can
talk about Maori “property rights” before the British
colonization as if the discourse of property is culturally
neutral and can be applied across cultures.243 Even when we
recognize that property talk might be problematic—that it
might be something of a cheat—it is difficult to escape.
Richard Overstall has to place it in quotes in his
Encountering the Spirit of the Land: “Property” in a
Kinship-Based Legal Order.244 In doing so, he recognizes
that property might not be the most useful way to
categorize the ways the First Nations of British Columbia
spoke about their relationship to the land, but that he is
unable to completely escape the category of property.245
The authors of the Glanvill and Bracton treatises were, in
a sense, the common law’s first comparativists. They did not
think of themselves in this way. Rather, they were working
hard to show that there was nothing to compare; English
court practice was Roman law. Their failure to demonstrate
this in a consistent way shows us just how peculiar the
language of property can be. The ways we talk about the
relationship between people and things are not neutral and
we should be careful not to mislead ourselves by applying
them to situations where they are inappropriate, or we risk
writing ourselves into the same complicated mess the
Bracton authors found themselves in.
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